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Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial 
economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed 
to the current financial crisis.  These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, 
conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of appropriate regulation, 
asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities.  However, 
the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ 
that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of 
the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated.  Taking 
the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the 
current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an 
attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology 
of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight.  And in particular, into a 
system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal 
pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while 
inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms).  A key component in the 
effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a 
major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital.  The 
architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from 
the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries 
of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as 
intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left.  
Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their 
greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on 
the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff. 
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They constantly try to escape 
      From the darkness outside and within 
      By dreaming of systems so perfect that no one will need to be good. 
T S Eliot  
 
I believe that banking institutions are more dangerous  
to our liberties than standing armies.   
Thomas Jefferson 
 
 Today the appeal to newness, of no matter what kind,  
provided only that it is archaic enough,  
has become universal 
Theodor Adorno 
 
[...] and, above all, let finance be primarily national.  




1.-  Introduction1  The dance of the trillions  
 
Even for those familiar with events and figures in international financial markets, the 
sheer magnitude of the numbers both in the upswing and in the downswing of the 
current cycle is truly remarkable.  For example, in the upswing (1980-2007), in real 
terms the four components of the stock of global financial assets (equity, public and 
private bonds and bank assets) jumped 9-fold, increasing from US$27 to US$241 
trillion (US$ at 2007 value).  As a result, the multiple of the stock of financial assets 
to world output augmented nearly 4-fold (from just under 1.2 to 4.4; see Figure 1).2 
                                   
1  I would like to thank Paulo Arantes, Jonathan Di John, Daniel Hahn, Geoff Harcourt, 
Mushtaq Khan, Jacqui Lagrue, Isidoro Palma Matte, Carlota Pérez, Jonathan Pincus, Bob 
Rowthorn, Ignês Sodré, Robert Wade and especially Stephanie Blankenburg and Samer 
Frangie for very helpful observations.  My much missed friends Daniel Chudnovsky and 
Andrew Glyn, four anonymous referees and participants at various seminars also made 
valuable comments.  Lastly, I am very grateful to my former Ph.D. students Jaime Crispi and 
Carlos Lopes for the many lively discussions we had on financial crises before their sudden 
deaths; I dedicate this paper to them.  The usual caveats apply. 
2  During this 27-year period, the capitalization of equity markets increased from US$7 to 
US$65 trillion; the value of private and government debt securities from US$9 to US$80 
trillion; and bank assets from US$11 to US$96 trillion (on the latter number, see notes below 




●  (a)=collapse of the ‘dotcom’ bubble.  Source: for 1990-2007, IMF (2009), and for 1980, 
McKinsey (2009; data available only for 1980; McKinsey’s data are based on IMF statistics, 
but include bank deposits rather than bank assets).  
 
In turn, Figure 2 indicates the remarkable size of the second financial bubble of the 
period (following the recovery from 9/11).  This bubble was especially large in some 
countries of the European periphery (such as Iceland, Ireland and Spain), and in 




●  US = United States; EU = European Monetary Union; Jp = Japan; Sp = Spain; UK = 
United Kingdom; Fr = France; Ir = Ireland; LA = Latin America; ME = Middle East; Af = 
Africa; EE = Eastern Europe.  Source:  IMF (2009).3 
 
And in terms of the legendary size of the derivatives markets, according to the BIS 
(2009) in just the last ten years the amounts outstanding of over-the-counter 
derivative contracts jumped 7.5-fold (from US$92 to US$683 trillion) – or from 2.4 
to 11 times the size of global output.  In turn, their gross market value increased 
even faster, 10-fold, or from US$3.3 to US$34 trillion; i.e., the gross market value 
of these ‘financial weapons of mass destruction’ (as Warren Buffett famously 
labelled them) grew about eight times faster than world output (all figures in US$ at 
2008 value).  In turn, derivative contracts involving commodities (excluding gold) 
increased 59-fold during this decade – or at an average annual real rate of growth of 
51%, reaching in June 2008 a gross market value of US$2.2 trillion (and a notional 
one of US$12.6 trillion).  In fact, this frantic speculation is probably much more 
                                   
3  Unfortunately, the IMF does not report data on Iceland.  According to a senior IMF official, 
what one has to understand is that “Iceland is now no longer a country. It is a hedge fund” 
(quoted in Lewis, 2009).  
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important than demand from China in explaining the relatively generalized boom in 
commodity prices in the years preceding the onset of the current crisis (and the 
differential behaviour of commodity prices since then).  
As is well known, one of the main problems of the current crisis is that the 
globalisation of financial markets brought a huge increase in the volatility and in the 
correlation of returns on financial assets.  In fact, now shockwaves are transmitted – 
and amplified – to such an extent that a simple way to look at the onset of the 
current crisis would be to say that concerns over US$400 billion sub-prime lending 
in the US housing market led to the wiping off of about US$40 trillion in global asset 
markets…  This phenomenon has major policy implications; for example, what is the 
optimal level of capital account openness for a developing country under these 
circumstances?4  
 Turning to the core country of the system, Figure 3 illustrates the remarkable 














                                   
4  As Keynes argued, what is needed (and is probably needed today more than ever) is an 
international financial and payments system that at least partially insulates nations from the 
economic maladies of other nations.  It is the equivalent of quarantining nations where swine 
flu develops so they do not affect other people around the world (see Davidson, 2009).  He 
also argued (and especially successfully at Bretton Woods) for the right of nations to defend 




●  Household = total household sector domestic debt (consumer and mortgage debt); 
public = total public sector domestic sector debt (local and federal); business = total non-
financial business sector domestic debt (corporate and non-corporate); financial = total 
financial sector domestic debt.  Percentages shown in the graph above the bars are average 
annual real rates of growth of overall domestic debt and of gross domestic product (GDP) in 
each period, respectively; those next to the legends are rates of growth of the respective 
sectors for the three periods.  Source: US Federal Reserve (2009).  
 
Of the many issues that emerge from Figure 3, from the perspective of this paper 
the two outstanding ones are the (better-known) increasing detachment of the 
growth of overall domestic debt from that of output; and the (lesser-known) fact 
that the rapid acceleration of the rate of growth of domestic debt after the 1997 
East Asian crisis (and the 1998 Brazilian one) is entirely due to the non-financial 
private sector (both business and household).  As middle-income developing 
countries turned less attractive (and more able to generate their own foreign-
exchange denominated finance), and as the US’s public sector began to tap into this 
ever growing Asian ‘savings glut’, the US’s and other industrialised countries’ non-
financial private sectors became the target of ever more liquid financial markets.  
That is, they increasingly became the financial markets’ customers of ‘last resort’.  
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And if the demand from these private agents was not growing fast enough, 
imaginative ‘financial engineering’ could give it a bit of a push.  In fact, household 
mortgage debt, after having grown between 1982 and 1997 at exactly the same 
pace as between 1950 and 1982 (about 5.7% per annum), it then jumped to an 
8.7% annual real rate of growth (1997-2007).  And that of the non-financial 
business sector nearly doubled from 3.5% (1982-1997) to 6% (1997-2007) – all 
figures in US$ at 2007 value.  Figure 4 shows the same data, but as a share of GDP. 
FIGURE 4 
 
●  Household = total household sector domestic debt (consumer and mortgage debt); 
public = total public sector domestic sector debt (local and federal); business = total non-
financial business sector domestic debt (corporate and non-corporate); financial = total 
financial sector domestic debt.  Percentages shown in the graph are average annual real 
rates of growth of overall domestic debt and of gross domestic product (GDP) in each period, 
respectively.  Source: US Federal Reserve (2009).   
 
As could have been already deduced from Figure 3 above, total domestic debt 
remained relatively stable as a share of GDP before 1980 (increasing only from 
140% to 158% in the nearly three decades between 1950 and the year before the 
appointment of Paul Volker to the Fed).  After that, it jumped from 158% to 247% 
in the next nearly two decades (1978 to 1997), to add no less than a whole 100 
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percentage points in the next decade.  How anyone could think that such 
remarkable increases in the level of debt by both the financial and the non-financial 
sectors could be sustainable in the long run?  Or how could anyone think that if (as 
a result of the inevitable financial fragilities emerging from this debt explosion) 
banks could not dazzle investors and regulators with might, it was perfectly 
acceptable that they could puzzle them with increasingly fudged balance sheets?5  
How anyone could think that the markets would never call this blatant bluff is 
anybody’s guess!  
 Turning to the downswing and bust of the cycle, Greenspan (2009) estimates 
that “[…] the aggregate equity loss amounts to well over US$40 trillion, a staggering 
two-thirds of last year’s global gross domestic product.”  Recent estimates have 
increased this figure to over US$50 trillion, as just the loss in terms of household 
net worth in the US has already reached US$14 trillion.6  Furthermore, according to 
the Stiglitz UN-Commission, up to 50 million people could become unemployed in 
2009, and "[s]ome 200 million people, mostly in developing economies, could be 
pushed into poverty […]”.  (Stiglitz, 2009).  
 
2.-  How did we get into such a mess? 
 
According to the central postulate of mainstream economics of the neo-classical-
type, if rational (i.e., utility-maximising) and selfish economic agents are allowed to 
interact freely in competitive markets, the outcome will be something called 
‘equilibrium’.  Furthermore, this equilibrium is not only bound to be optimal, but also 
intrinsically stable and capable of ‘self-correction’.  All that is required to achieve 
these remarkable features are that the markets are allowed to work freely (i.e., 
prices and wages are allowed to adjust without restraint so that the markets can 
                                   
5  At the end of 2008 the US’s four biggest banks by assets did not have that much less 
assets in ‘off-balance-sheet vehicles’ than on their books (US$5.2 and US$7.2 trillion, 
respectively).  As Reilly explains, “[o]ff-balance-sheet vehicles helped inflate the credit 
bubble by letting banks originate and sell loans without having to put aside much capital for 
them.  So as lending soared, banks didn’t have an adequate buffer against losses” 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&refer=columnist_reilly&sid= 
aRPE735QhI8U).   
6  See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/. 
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clear), and that property rights are well-defined and properly enforced (so that this 
can be achieved with minimum transaction costs).7  
Furthermore, according to this approach, financial markets are supposed to 
play only an essentially passive rôle of discounting a future that is predictable (in a 
probabilistic sense), and are able to do so with amazing accuracy.  So, within this 
framework, financial crises can only occur due to external interference in otherwise 
perfectly efficient market mechanisms such as governments behaving irresponsibly 
(e.g., monetising large fiscal deficits, as in so-called ‘first generation’ models of 
financial crisis); due to bad luck (e.g., self-fulfilling runs on central banks without 
enough reserves, as in ‘second generation’ models); or due to something – it could 
be almost anything – causing a sudden large currency depreciation in economies 
that are not fundamentally unsound (e.g., a moral-hazard-driven bubble with an 
excessive build-up of external debt, open-economy bank-runs, or currency 
mismatches on the liability side of balance sheets, as in different versions of ‘third 
generation’ models). 
Additionally, according to the ‘efficient capital market theory’, in financial 
markets prices at all times reflect all available information; basically, there cannot 
be an endogenous gap between market prices and fundamentals – let alone a 
bubble.  That is, asset prices deserve a pedestal, and stock options are the most 
rational reward for good performance.  At the same time, stock prices are supposed 
to be a ‘random walk’; i.e., particularly under risk neutrality, there is no scope for 
profitable speculation because a rational stock market cannot be beaten on any 
consistent basis.  The key point here is that if financial markets get misaligned, they 
always ‘self-correct’.  Smart market players would simply force stock prices to 
become rational by doing exactly the opposite of what they do in real life: take the 
other side of trades if prices begin to develop a pattern (as this is bound to have no 
substance).  In other words, for the efficient market theology a ‘rational surfer’ is 
                                   
7  The unspoken exception, of course, is intellectual property rights (IPRs) – the better 
defined and enforced, the higher the associated transaction costs…  The implicit assumption 
is that if their aim is to capture Schumpeterian (rather than just monopoly) rents; and if 
these are used effectively; and if they result in further innovations; and if the resulting new 
innovations are again priced ‘Schumpeterianly’ (rather than just monopolistically), and so on, 
then everybody could benefit in the long-term.  That is, as usual, a rather long sequence of 
‘ifs’…  
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not the one that has fun riding waves, but the one that gets drowned trying to 
create undertows.8 
In sum, in the words of the current Director of the White House's National 
Economic Council, “[in financial markets] prices will always reflect fundamental 
values […].  The logic of efficient markets is compelling.” (Summers and Summers, 
1989).9  In fact, we now know that Alan Greenspan was even against tightening 
regulation against financial fraud, as rational markets can take care of themselves.10   
In turn, in some mainstream economics of the ‘new’ type endogenous market 
failures are finally allowed to exist, and they can lead to sub-optimal (and multiple) 
equilibria; i.e., the first law of Welfare Economics is obviously wrong.  Nevertheless, 
although a rôle for policy is therefore (reluctantly) accepted, but only under very 
strict governance structures, these outcomes (including those in financial markets) 
are still understood as intrinsically of the ‘equilibrium’ type.  In fact, New Keynesian 
theorists (like New Classicals) still work within a ‘complete markets paradigm’, and 
with the strongest version of the efficient markets hypothesis (see Buiter, 2009B). 
Furthermore, within mainstream economics the acceptable range of ideas has 
narrowed down continuously since the famous ‘capital controversies’, and the 
monetarists versus Keynesian debates of the 1970s.  A student of economics today 
could be forgiven for believing that the range of debate in economic theory only 
spans two competing schools of thought within dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium models: those that engineer them as real business cycles and those that 
do so as micro-foundations models.  More specifically, mainstream economics tells 
us that endogenous market outcomes depend only on whether or not prices and 
wages are a bit "sticky" (due to potential price and wage inflexibilities) and related 
                                   
8  When I participated in 2008 in a panel to nominate candidates for the biannual ‘Deutsche 
Bank Prize in Financial Economics’ (worth 50,000 euros), organised by The Center for 
Financial Studies of the Goethe University in Frankfurt, I learned that the first prize, awarded 
in 2005, had been given to Eugene Fama from Chicago University.  According to the citation, 
“he had been honoured for his theory of efficient markets”; that is, for developing what 
proved to be a rather remarkable intellectual weapons of mass destruction (see http://www. 
ifk-cfs.de/index.php?id=901).  As with the traders who got bonuses for placing silly bets, 
maybe one day someone will ask him to donate the money to charity…  
9  As always happens when there is an unremitting need to idealise something, for neo-
classical analysis to be able to sustain its remarkable idealisation of competitive markets it 
needs simultaneously to demonise constantly something else – in this case normally anything 
to do with ‘governments’.  On idealisation, see Sodré (2009). 
10  See http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/3/27/172419/727.   
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market failures.  That is, market outcomes depend only on (say) whether ‘markets’ 
perform as smoothly and predictably as a car made in Japan, or bit more 
capriciously (like one made in Britain).11  
And as far as whether money and finance can affect long-term growth, Lucas’ 
proposition that only real forces can truly affect employment and production became 
the only game in town (see Lucas, 1995).  So, in first and second generation models 
of financial crises, as these are mainly about ill-advised monetary policy, crises are 
supposed to be harmless to the real economy.  Only in third-generation models can 
crises become ‘real’, but this is only due to sudden currency depreciations causing 
havoc in features such as balance sheets – so the real economy can plunge into a 
crisis (see Krugman, 2001).  
Therefore, within the mainstream framework it is simply not possible to 
understand the complexities of current events – let alone devise effective policies to 
avoid their repetition.  In fact, in his recent Lionel Robbins Memorial Lecture at the 
London School of Economics Paul Krugman argued that in much of the past 30 years 
macroeconomics was "spectacularly useless at best, and positively harmful at 
worst."12  And according to Willem Buiter, writing in the Financial Times, “[…] the 
typical graduate macroeconomics and monetary economics training received at 
Anglo-American universities during the past 30 years or so, may have set back by 
decades serious investigations of aggregate economic behaviour and economic 
policy-relevant understanding.  It was a privately and socially costly waste of time 
and other resources” (2009B).13   
                                   
11  In his Marshall Lecture at Cambridge University, Stiglitz told the story that when he was 
appointed by Bill Clinton to the Council of Economic Advisers his first task was to try to do 
something about the problem of rising unemployment.  He needed staff, so he advertised for 
an economist; when interviewing he had to go down to something like number 15 in the 
shortlist to find the first candidate who thought that unemployment was a problem a bit more 
complex than just workers refusing to accept a market wage…  
12  See http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/events/event.asp?id=92.  
13  One of a rather large number of examples of the irrelevance of mainstream economics to 
understand the real world, as Michael Spence of the Hoover Institute explains, is that “[…] 
the failure of theoretical models to explain extreme macroeconomic fluctuations makes 
effective action difficult to implement.  Currently, economic models forecast an infinite path 
of either endless positive or negative growth.  Economists are therefore forced to explain 
deviations from or transitions between these two different dynamics (e.g. moving from a 
period of growth to a period of recession) as a ‘jump’ onto a new model or growth path.  This 
makes them little use for government policy formulation, as the understanding of the ‘jump’ 
is exogenous to the model” (http://www.magd.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/6510/ 
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From this perspective, perhaps what defines an alternative understanding of 
financial markets as ‘heterodox’ is that it postulates that the endogenous outcome of 
the free interaction in financial markets of intelligent, rational, utility-maximising 
and selfish individuals can be not just a sub-optimal equilibrium but, at times, a 
financial crisis proper - now, why in economics today one has to be ‘heterodox’ to 
understand such an obvious fact is another matter altogether.14  One of the crucial 
issues here, as Keynes’ liquidity theory points out, is that decision makers do not 
really know, and cannot possible know, the future outcome of current financial 
decisions – the future is uncertain and not merely probabilistically risky (see 
Davidson, 2007).  In fact, financial fragilities are part of the normal economic cycle, 
with speculative bubbles endogenous to financial markets; according to Minsky, "[a] 
fundamental characteristic of our economy is that the financial system swings 
between robustness and fragility and these swings are an integral part of the 
process that generates business cycles." (1974, p. 269).  “In particular, over a 
protracted period of good times, capitalist economies tend to move from a financial 
structure dominated by hedge finance units to a structure in which there is large 
weight to units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance.” (Minsky, 1992, p. 8)15  
That is, from time to time financial markets are likely to become intrinsically 
unstable and (particularly with excess liquidity) unable to self-correct (see 
Kindleberger, 1986).  In fact, instead of ‘automatic stabilisers’, they can easily be 
derailed even further by ‘automatic de-stabilisers’ (see Stiglitz, 2003).   
From this viewpoint, Barry Eichengreen’s now famous remarks in a way miss 
the point:   
The Great Credit Crisis has cast into doubt much of what we thought we knew 
about economics. We thought that monetary policy had tamed the business cycle. 
We thought that because changes in central-bank policies had delivered low and 
stable inflation, the volatility of the pre-1985 years had been consigned to the 
dustbin of history; they had given way to the quaintly dubbed “Great 
Moderation.” We thought that financial institutions and markets had come to be 
self-regulating – that investors could be left largely if not wholly to their own 
                                                                                                           
Trinity-09.pdf.  
14  According to (the not-very-heterodox) Niall Ferguson (2008), the inability of mainstream 
economists to understand the likelihood of financial crisis can only be the result of their lack 
of knowledge of financial history.  
15  See also Minsky (1986).  McCulley, for example, discusses how the sub-prime crisis fits 
neatly into Minsky’s financial fragility hypotheses (McCulley, 2009).  
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devices. Above all we thought that we had learned how to prevent the kind of 
financial calamity that struck the world in 1929 (2009).  
 
The Great Credit Crisis (as Eichengreen calls it) has only cast into doubt much of 
what mainstream economists thought they knew about economics.  From Keynes to 
Minsky, Kindleberger, Stiglitz, Krugman, Davidson, Roubini, Buiter and many others, 
there was a comprehensive body of literature perfectly capable of understanding 
why borrowers and lenders – both in industrialised and developing countries – could 
easily accumulate far more risk than is privately efficient – let alone socially 
efficient; and that financial crises could occur for more reasons than monetised 
government deficits, moral hazards due to government guarantees, bad luck, mob-
psychology, crony capitalism, incompetent regulations, misguided policy or other 
exogenous factors interfering with the otherwise perfectly efficient allocation of 
resources by financial markets.16  The current global financial crisis is a paradigmatic 
case of this.  That mainstream economics had conveniently ignored that whole body 
of literature is another matter altogether.  
So, it should not be that surprising that despite much effort – remember 
those blaming ‘liberals’ for the sub-prime crisis because of a 1977 law that helps 
low-income people get mortgages?17 – mainstream economists have not been able 
to produce for the current crisis a credible smoking gun explanation of the 
‘exogenous’ type.  That is, this time there has not been much room for market 
devotees’ excuses of the ‘blaming something/someone else’ type.18  
In fact, even Greenspan, like a general who decides to rethink his military 
strategy only after losing the war, has lately moved slightly in the ‘financial crises as 
endogenous free markets phenomena’ direction.  For example, he famously 
acknowledged in October 2008 (in his testimony to Congress) that he – and his free-
market ideology – was “in a state of shocked disbelief”.  His real business cycle-type 
thinking had been behind his conviction that in financial markets there are no major 
market failures; and that the incentive of shareholders to maximise their value 
                                   
16  For an analysis of recent financial crises in developing countries, see Palma (2008C).  
17  See http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=did_liberals_cause_the_subprime_crisis.   
18  This does not mean that market aficionados have given up; the contributors to Booth 
(2009), for example, conclude that government and central bankers must take all the blame 
for the financial crisis; bankers, investors and other market players, of course, should be 
totally exonerated.   
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would lead them to control the behaviour of managers and traders properly.  As a 
result, he had entirely missed the possibility that financial deregulation could 
unleash such destructive forces on the economy.19  He also acknowledged that the 
current crisis shows that the basic premises of the traditional risk-management 
theory are wrong; and that financial markets can indeed be inherently unstable, 
especially due to their increasing complexities.  Furthermore, for post-2007 
Greenspan, when financial markets are shocked out of equilibrium they may well be 
unable to self-correct – as in the recent bubble (see Greenspan, 2009).  
This paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that have led to 
the current financial crisis from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-
Kindlebergian financial economics (more recently enriched by, among others, those 
economists mentioned above, as well as by behaviourist and psychoanalytic 
approaches to finance, and Neo-Schumpeterian long-term views of the relationship 
between technology and finance).20  However, the paper then proceeds to argue 
that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes 
analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and 
distributional outcomes in which it had operated.  So, the analysis then takes on the 
perspective of critical social theories (especially Marxian and Foucauldian) and 
concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something 
much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, 
neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a 
rentiers’ delight.  And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big 
business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in 
competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate 
on workers and small firms).21  A key component in the effectiveness of this new 
                                   
19  So, instead of behaving as a good old-fashioned central banker – one who takes away the 
punchbowl when the party gets going – he was happy instead to fill it up with ‘high-spirited’ 
easy money and easy credit.  
20  On the latter three, see for example Broihanne et. al. (2008); Tuckett and Taffler (2008); 
and Pérez (2002), respectively.  
21  For an analysis of the rôle of ‘compulsions’ within capitalism, see Foucault (2004); for him, 
the emergence of modernity and of capitalism was not at all about the ‘relaxation’ of 
compulsions (as most liberals believe), but about the development of new (and more 
effective) forms of compulsion.  In turn, for Khan (2005) “[…] capitalism is characterised not 
just by the presence of market opportunities, which have always been present in societies 
with markets, but also by a hitherto unknown introduction of market compulsions, which 
ensured that both capitalists and workers continuously had to strive to improve their 
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technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of 
the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital.  The architects of 
this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the 
financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries 
of the preceding techno-economic paradigm – that of the age of the automobile, oil, 
petrochemicals and mass production), some political groups, as well as intellectual 
networks with their allies – including lots of economists and the ‘new’ left.  Although 
rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their 
greed, in the end the crisis materialised when the markets took their inevitable 
revenge on the rentiers by calling the neo-liberal bluff.  
So, how did we get into such a mess?  This paper will argue that this crisis 
was the result of a unique combination of an ideology that became toxic, powerful 
and intrinsically rentier special-interest groups, populist politics (led by the most 
remarkably unimaginative and accommodating political élite for generations), bad 
economics, and downright incompetence.  
 
3.-  What is neo-liberalism – and why did it become so toxic?  
 
Polanyi (1944) was one of the first to suggest that capitalism will tend to alternate 
between periods with little market regulation, and periods in which society 
intervenes actively to regulate market activity, especially in the labour market and 
finance.  Kalecki (1943) had also envisaged long-term cycles within capitalism (see 
Figure 6 below).  Evolutionary and neo-Schumpeterian economists also tell us that 
capitalism will move along long-term technological cycles due to the different nature 
of the ‘installation’ and the ‘deployment’ phases of new techno-economic paradigms 
(see Pérez, 2002).  And Hirschman (1982) too discussed what he saw as long-term 
cycles of preferences for public versus private provision of goods.  According to him, 
the backlash against the Keynesianism and dirigiste policies had a lot to do with the 
stagflation in the 1970s.  This accelerated a growing collective frustration concerning 
the effectiveness of state regulation and led to radical calls for more laissez-faire 
                                                                                                           
performance just in order to survive.  […] Only capitalist appropriation depends on market 
competition and therefore on the systematic improvement of labour productivity. Only 
capitalism, then, depends on constantly improving the forces of production.  And only in 
capitalism is it necessary to grow just to stay in the same place”. (2005, p. 72)   
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policies.  He argued that sustained frustration and disappointment with existing 
institutions can lead to dramatic ‘rebound effects’ demanding radical changes in 
policy.  Long-term cycles of preferences for public versus private provision of goods 
may be explained by such mechanisms.  For Hirschman, such disappointment must 
often go through a threshold before it is consciously acknowledged; people have a 
tendency to deny bad choices and stick to them for too long.  But when they do 
finally admit to their disappointment, there will be a ‘rebound effect’.  That is, 
Hirschman thinks that ‘reverse shifts’ are more radical as a result.  In fact, he thinks 
that "a good portion of the so-called puzzle of collective action and participation in 
public affairs disappears when the rebound effect is taken into account" (1982, p. 
81).22 
Probably the most transparent and remarkable of these ‘rebound effects’ took 
place towards the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s (at the same 
time as the new ‘IT’ technological revolution began its ‘installation’ phase).  Perhaps 
the simplest way to illustrate statistically the nature of this ‘reverse shift’ (from the 
liberal-Keynesian to the neo-liberal era) is by showing what happened to the share 
of income of the top 1% in the US between the financial meltdowns in 1929 and in 
2007 (see Figure 5).  
                                   





●  [1] = including realised capital gains; and [2] = excluding capital gains.  3-year moving 
averages.  Source: Piketty and Sáez (2003; updated to 2006 in http://elsa.berkeley.edu/ 
~saez/TabFig2006.xls).23  This is the source of all data on income distribution in the US 
below.   
 
As is evident from Figure 5 the fortunes of the richest 1% in the US took a rather 
remarkable turn after the appointment of Paul Volker (and his flamboyant 
monetarism) to the Fed in 1979, and the election of Reagan as president a year 
later: including realised capital gains, the share in national income of this small 
group increased from 8.9% to 22.8% between then and 2006 – or from 8% to 18% 
if capital gains are excluded.24  In fact, (as evolutionary economists working on 
                                   
23  Computations by authors on tax return statistics (the number of tax returns in 2006 was 
138 million).  Income defined as annual gross income reported on tax returns excluding all 
government transfers (such as social security, unemployment benefits, welfare payments, 
etc.), and before individual income taxes and employees' payroll taxes (but after employers’ 
payroll taxes and corporate income taxes).  
24  In turn, including capital gains, the share of the richest 0.5% increased from 6.2% to 
18.6%; that of the top 0.1% jumped from 2.7% to 12.6%; and that of the 0.01% shot up 
from 0.9% to 5.5%.  Remarkable as this income polarization may be, as these data are 
based on income tax statistics it is likely that they even underestimate (perhaps significantly) 
the increase in the income share at the top of the distribution after 1980. Financial 
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techno-economic paradigms anticipated) by 2006 the share of the top 1% in the US 
had already returned to its pre-1929 level.  A relatively similar scenario is found in 
the UK after the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 (see Atkinson, 2007), and in 
Australia (see Harcourt, 2001).  In turn, Figure 6 shows the remarkable reversal of 
fortune between the top 1% and the bottom 90% of the US working population.  
FIGURE 6 
 
●  Percentages shown in the graph are average annual real rates of growth in respective 
cycles (1933-1973 and 1973-2006 for the bottom 90%, and 1936-1980 and 1980-2006 for 
the top 1%).  3-year moving averages.  Source: Piketty and Sáez (2003).  
 
While average income of the bottom 90% was growing four times faster than that of 
the top 1% during the long Keynesian cycle, during the following one the former 
stagnated as the latter surged ahead.  In fact, as Kalecki had analysed in 1943, both 
Keynesian-style liberalism and neo-liberalism are basically counter-cyclical, but each 
                                                                                                           
liberalization, increased capital mobility, and the proliferation of ‘tax havens’ made it much 
easier for this income group to evade taxes (see, for example, http://www.nybooks. 
com/articles/22245).  UBS has recently acknowledged that it helped 47,000 wealthy 
individuals in the US to evade taxes; see http://www.livemint.com/2009/03/05100631/ UBS-
says-47000-Americans-had.html. 
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for a different phase of the cycle.  Both seek to change the balance of power 
between income groups: Keynesianism in order to prevent the disruptive effects of 
crisis-ridden capitalism, neo-liberalism in order to return power and control to their 
‘rightful owners’ – capital (see Wood, 1999).  
A summary along Kalecki’s lines of this switching-cycles logic is given by Sir 
Alan Budd (a top UK Treasury civil servant, and strong supporter of monetarism at 
the time, who later became Provost of The Queen's College, Oxford): 
“The Thatcher government never believed for a moment that [monetarism] was 
the correct way to bring down inflation.  They did however see that this would 
be a very good way to raise unemployment.  And raising unemployment was an 
extremely desirable way of reducing the strength of the working classes.  [...] 
What was engineered – in Marxist terms – was a crisis of capitalism which re-
created the reserve army of labour, and has allowed the capitalists to make high 
profits ever since” (quoted in Cohen, 2003, p. 13).  
 
To analyse further what the new neo-liberal counter-cyclical transformation was 
really about one should perhaps begin by indicating that what is common to its 
ideological discourse and that of nineteenth-century liberal thinking is the supposed 
harmony between the private and the social spheres (in the context of a ‘minimal’ 
state).25  The implication is that this ‘harmony’ happens because the (supposedly 
class-blind) ‘invisible hand’ is the mechanism in charge of translating private self-
interest into optimal social outcomes.  So, as mentioned above (Section 2), 
competitive markets in which enlightened economic agents are able to maximise 
their own private selfish interests becomes the stuff that social optimum dreams are 
made of. 
Of course, the automatic and necessary translation of selfish private interests 
into social optima is a rather useful story for the liberal discourse.  Not everybody 
will be happy in capitalism, but whenever individuals are not happy it is because 
they have just had bad luck, or have lacked useful skills, have operated in an 
institutional setting that has hindered competitive free markets, or have themselves 
been guilty of resisting the harmonising magic of the invisible hand (which is their 
own fault anyway, and can be changed).  As a result, distributive outcomes are 
supposedly not the product of any form of exploitation or power relations that 
                                   
25  The state should also have no right to interfere in private lives (i.e., state as a ‘night-
watchman’); e.g., religion should be strictly a private affair.  See Hirschman (1997).  
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favour some and disadvantage others in any systematic way.  There are bound to be 
winners and losers, but only in a strictly Darwinian sense.  In sum, within this 
framework it cannot be said that in capitalism there are systematic inequalities or 
injustices, only anonymous market forces that produce an efficient distributive 
outcome (given certain conditions).  Furthermore, the story of anonymous free 
market forces and optimum equilibria allows one to blame the state (and those who 
do not respect the rules of the game) rather than capitalism or unregulated markets 
for anything that goes wrong.  
However, there are also huge differences between the classical-liberal and 
the neo-liberal discourses.  Smith and the Enlightenment were of course right about 
the fundamental issue that human beings can look after their own interests without 
needing a Church or a King to tell them what to do.  This was a remarkably 
progressive proposition for its time.  In fact, the three pillars of the classical liberal 
discourse—‘markets’, ‘knowledge’ (i.e., sciences and rationalism) and (individual) 
‘freedom’—had this progressive characteristic.  So did the Keynesian-style liberalism 
that emerged in the previous switching of long-run cycles (mid-1930s) mostly as a 
result of a ‘rebound effect’ due to the long depression and events in Russia and 
Germany.  In actual fact, its innovative vision not only tried to reformulate all three 
pillars of the liberal discourse, but went so far as to question the supposed harmony 
between the private and the social spheres.26  Basically, for Keynesian-style 
liberalism unregulated market forces could, at best, offer sub-optimal equilibria and 
unemployment, and at worst, crises of the magnitude of that of the 1930s.  So, in 
order to be able to translate private self-interest into optimal social outcomes what 
was necessary was a new strong agency from the state.  In this new vision, the 
three pillars of the liberal discourse had to be reformulated.  ‘Markets’ should only 
be understood as good servants, but bad masters of economic life; ‘knowledge’ now 
had the crucial task of helping to engineer the new agency from the state; and 
individual ‘freedom’ would only be meaningful if it embraced social justice 
(otherwise, it would be mostly empty rhetoric). 
                                   
26  According to Deane, “[t]he iconoclastic conclusion of [Keynes’] analysis was that there 
was no invisible hand translating private self-interests into social benefit.  This was the nub 
of the Keynesian heresy” (1980, p. 182).  
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Neo-liberalism, meanwhile, is a different discursive story altogether – and 
one that in practice has taken this long line of progressive liberal thinking not 
forward but backwards.  Its huge complexities are reflected in the fact that there are 
many competing narratives regarding both its nature and success.  In this paper I 
shall concentrate on two competing narratives of its nature emanating from the 
perspective of critical social theories (the Marxian and the Foucauldian).  According 
to the former, neo-liberalism is not a revolution but a counter-revolution (along the 
lines of the above quote by Sir Alan Budd).  According to the Foucauldian, it is a 
novel reconfiguration of power leading to a new type of Governmentality – i.e., a new 
form of interaction between political power (and knowledge and discourse) and the 
dynamics of unregulated markets.  
In the Marxian narrative, the neo-liberal project represented a counter-
offensive by capital, following decades of continuous full-employment, rising real 
wages, improving income distribution, welfarist policies and all forms of government 
intervention, which reached its culmination with the difficult economic environment 
during the stagflation of the 1970s (due only in part to exogenous shocks, such as 
the oil price increase that followed the ‘Yom Kippur’ war).  This counteroffensive was 
helped (among many other things) by the lack of credible opposition that followed 
the collapse (mostly from within) of communism.  In short, what the neo-liberal 
discourse was really about was capital attempting to regain its power and control 
through a new form of legitimisation and more sophisticated technologies of 
dispossession.  That is, it was an attempt by the so-called ‘angry right’ to reassert 
class power – ‘angry’ in the sense that although rentiers had already been furious 
for a long time (as they had been the main losers of the welfarist ‘pact’ between 
unions and industrial capital that characterised the Keynesian era – leading some 
analysts in the past to label the post-1980 neo-liberal period as that of ‘the revenge 
of the rentier’), during the 1970s they were joined in their discontent by industrial 
and other productive capitalists who had previously done rather well during the 
‘Golden Age’.  For the latter, things had become difficult due to the so-called ‘profit 
squeeze’ that began during the late 1960s (as the techno-economic paradigm of the 
time was reaching maturity), and the stagflation of the 1970s.27 
                                   
27  As a result, these groups were facing the combined effect of (among other things) a 
further decline in their share of income and a squeeze of their profit rates (Figures 5, 6 and 
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A complementary narrative along the lines of neo-liberalism as an 
overwhelming right-wing offensive can be constructed along Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2005) lines: the above political and (in particular) economic problems lay at the 
root of the ascent of neo-liberalism in the sense that they helped the different 
factions of the capitalist élite both (finally) to solve their ‘collective action’ problem, 
and to start committing sufficient economic resources to achieve the de facto 
political power needed to succeed in this project. 
In the traditional Marxian reading, neo-liberal theories are mostly an 
ideological cover for the process of restoration of capitalist class power.  As such, 
neo-liberalism as a social theory is not that relevant as it is mainly an exercise in 
the legitimation of the economic practices taking place (see Harvey, 2005). 
The most common criticism of the Marxian account is that although it rightly 
unmasks the class interests behind neo-liberalism, it does not explain sufficiently 
how neo-liberalism came to be a dominant ideology, or how this ideology was able 
to reshape the social world in order to secure its goals of dispossession and 
restoration of class power – let alone how was it able to achieve this within a 
democracy via a ‘spontaneous consensus’ type of hegemony (in the Gramscian 
sense).  To say that this happened because it was useful for capital would be a 
functionalist explanation.  Such an explanation would lack a proper historical subject 
and would not provide an adequate account of the rise of neo liberalism (especially 
its grounding in the difficult economic and political environments that always 
characterises the process of switching techno-economic paradigms).  Furthermore, it 
is not at all obvious that those (successfully) conspiring to bring about their own 
short-term goals had a clearly defined and spelled-out ideology/legitimisation 
strategy ready at hand or in mind that would work in the medium or long term 
(somehow without much resistance from the loser).  The main point here is that the 
story is a lot more complex than an overwhelming right-wing offensive against a 
weakened opposition – although these two elements are obviously crucial 
components of the story of the success of neo-liberalism.  This complexity is not just 
                                                                                                           
7), an increase in taxation (Figure 13), a significant decline in corporate capitalisation (Figure 
18; which had led to a plunge of their ‘Tobin’s Q’ – Figure 19), and a collapse of their ‘net 
worth’ (Figure 22). 
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for complexity’s sake, but absolutely necessary to understand the intricate dynamic 
of the switching of long-term political and economic cycles.  
In short, there is no doubt that a powerful fight took place during the 1970s 
between those interests backing the welfare state (working class, some industrial 
capitalists, some political parties and intellectuals) and those wanting to dismantle it 
(financial rentiers, other industrial capitalists whose life was becoming increasingly 
difficult as the fourth techno-economic paradigm was reaching maturity and new 
opportunities for productivity growth were becoming scarce at the same time as 
competition from some East Asian countries was intensifying, some political parties 
and intellectuals, including a great deal of economists).  Equally there is little doubt 
that this struggle was won by one side via varying historical processes.  
Furthermore, as analysed below, what followed had unintended consequences that 
culminated in the current financial crisis.  However, there is not much evidence of a 
political ‘invisible hand’ guiding this transformation through the remarkable 
institutional and social complexities that characterised the places in which neo-
liberalism was developed as an ideology. 
One line of criticism to the Marxian analysis of neo-liberalism comes from the 
work of Michel Foucault.  He attempts to provide a description of the content of the 
neo-liberal ideology rather than an explanation of why this ideology became 
hegemonic.  According to Foucault the core aspect of neo-liberalism relates to the 
problem of the relationship between political power and the principles of a market 
economy – that is, the projection of the principles of a market economy onto the 
arts of governing.  In this respect, neo-liberalism is better seen as a characteristic 
way of problematising social reality rather than a set of fully developed theories.  It 
represents a ‘positive’ form of social regulation and not simply a set of ‘negative’ 
answers—such as the retreat of the state, the absence of regulation, or the 
disappearance of the nation-state (see especially Frangie, 2008). 
Neo-liberalism, according to Foucault, encompasses the various 
problematisations of the state, the social and the economy, which followed what was 
perceived as a long period of inefficient state interventions, stifling both society and 
the economy, and bordering, in a logical series of displacements, on becoming 
versions of the totalitarian state.  Starting from the belief in the market as the 
optimal form of social organisation, and acquitting markets of the ills of which they 
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were accused, the guiding question for neo-liberals was how to reformulate the 
political and the social in a way compatible with the ‘rationality of the (unregulated) 
market economy’.  Different answers were provided to this dilemma, representing 
various brands of neo-liberalism, united by the “question concerning the extent to 
which competitive, optimizing market relations and behaviours can serve as a 
principle not only for limiting governmental intervention, but also rationalizing 
government itself” (Burchell, 2001, p. 23). 
Trying to make some elements of the Marxian and the Foucauldian accounts 
of neo-liberalism fit together (as I attempt in this paper) is a rather problematic 
exercise.  The upholders of the former consider the Foucauldian ‘governmentality’ 
understanding as missing the crux of the neo-liberal revolution, namely its 
grounding in a class process of dispossession.  For the latter, the Marxian account is 
at best incomplete, and at worst ignores the novel reconfigurations of political and 
institutional power encapsulated by the neo-liberal revolution.  Underneath the 
theoretical differences between these two approaches, a deeper disagreement lurks 
regarding the understanding of ‘critique’.  Governmentality, by bracketing the 
evaluation of the arts of rationalities it investigates, has been opposed to Marxism or 
at least indifferent to its critical edge, imposing “a restriction that precludes 
problematising effects, and thus presumably eliminates the possibility of assigning 
costs to any mentality of rule” (O’Malley et al., 1997, p. 509).  In other words, 
Foucauldian accounts of neo-liberalism suspend judgement in their analysis, 
grounded in their scepticism regarding Marxian accounts of agency and historical 
development.  Neo-liberalism, according to this account, is a serious attempt at 
instituting new forms of rule almost irrespective of their effect on the pattern of 
inequality; they can be contingently used for the legitimation of increased 
inequalities but do not have to be so by necessity.  In a traditional Marxian reading, 
meanwhile, neo-liberalism is just a discourse that is used to legitimise new 
processes of dispossession and extreme forms of rent-seeking accumulation. 
From the perspective of this paper one of the few indisputable characteristics 
of neo-liberalism is that it emerged in opposition (in the form of an undertow) to the 
Keynesian consensus of the ‘Golden Age’.  Then, after many years on the fringes, it 
suddenly became mainstream among right-wing circles during the stagflation of the 
1970s.  This happened at the same time than the emergence of important economic 
problems and of political changes in right-wing parties.  Among the former the 
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crucial one was the beginning of the already-mentioned relative exhaustion of the 
fourth techno-economic paradigm; and among the political changes in right-wing 
parties the most important ones took place in Great Britain (this was the time when 
the Conservative Party switched from being ‘the party of state-owners to the party 
of state-agents’), and in the US (with the GOP’s ‘Southerner Strategy’ – 
‘government is the problem because it takes your money and gives it to Those 
People’).28  So, this was the time when the neo-liberal concern with ‘prudent-
macroeconomics-cum-smaller-governments’ became just a tactical discursive 
strategy, successfully framed within the ‘politics of resentment’ and a bogus (but 
remarkably ingenious) disguise of ‘modernity’. 
As in Figures 5 and 6 above, Figure 7 indicates that the extreme 
redistributive success of the post-1980 ‘neo-liberal rebound effect’ was due to its 
‘winner-takes-all’ nature (the same is found in Latin America; see Palma, 2007). 
FIGURE 7 
 
●  Percentages are average annual real rates of growth between 1933-78 and 1978-06.  
Includes capital gains.  3-year moving averages.  Source: Piketty and Sáez (2003). 
 
                                   
28  See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/opinion/02krugman.html. 
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In fact, according to the source, in real terms (i.e., US$ at 2006 values) the average 
annual income of the bottom 90% actually fell during the 33-year period between 
the 1973-oil crisis and 2006 (from US$31,300 to US$30,700).  Meanwhile, that of 
the top 1% increased 3.2-fold (from US$386 thousand to US$1.2 million).  What a 
difference from the previous decades of ‘liberal-Keynesianism’!  
Figure 8 shows just how little difference there is between Democrat and 
Republican administrations from this perspective during the neo-liberal cycle.  
During the seven-year period of economic expansion of the Clinton administration 
(1993-2000), and the four-year period of expansion of Bush’s (2002-06), ‘average’ 
real family incomes grew by 4% and 2.9% annually, respectively.  However, these 
averages disguise remarkable asymmetries: in fact the overall ‘average’ corresponds 
to that of percentiles 95-99 (something that did not happen even in Pinochet’s 
Chile; see Palma, 2007). 
FIGURE 8 
 
●  P = percentiles.  Source: Piketty and Sáez (2003).  
 
As a result, during the seven-year period of economic expansion of the Clinton 
administration the top 1% of income earners captured 45% of the total growth in 
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(pre-tax) income, while during Bush’s four-year period of expansion no less than 
73% of total income growth accrued to the top 1%.29  Perhaps the neo-liberal 
ideology associated with the post-1980 period (and its incredibly successful process 
of ‘re-legitimisation’ of capital) is just shorthand for ‘the art of getting away with 
such a remarkably asymmetric distributional outcome within a democracy’…  An 
alternative formulation would be that it is shorthand for ‘the art of generating a 
“spontaneous consensus-type of hegemony” that such a remarkably asymmetric 
distributional outcome is the only game in town’.  Another (related) working 
definition could be ‘the art of transforming a particularly asymmetric set of 
distributive strategic choices, and the corresponding payoffs, into a Nash 
equilibrium’ – as the majority becomes convinced that there is no point in trying to 
change such asymmetric distributive strategies while the all too powerful top income 
players keep theirs unchanged (despite the obvious fact that they could clearly 
improve their payoffs only if they could somehow agree on a strategy different from 
the current one – a rather good example of a Nash equilibrium that is not Pareto 
optimal…).30  
Figure 9 shows how the contrast between the fortunes of the great majority 
and those of the powerful minority gets even more extreme when the comparison is 
made with the very few at very top of the income distribution. 
                                   
29  See Piketty and Sáez (2003).  There does not seem to be much evidence in the US since 
the late 1970s to support a ‘median voter’ scenario, or trickle-down economics…  
30  Also, given the remarkable distributional outcome of this period, and what we now know 
about the genesis of the current financial crisis, one could also argue that neo-liberalism is 




●  Percentages are average annual real rates of growth in respective periods (1994-2000 and 
2002-2006).  Includes capital gains.  3-year moving averages.  Source: Piketty and Sáez 
(2003).  
 
While the average income of about 120 million families remained roughly stagnant 
during this 28-year period, the average of the top 0.01% increased 8.5 times.  So 
the multiple between the two incomes shot up in a way that ‘defies gravity’ – from 
its lowest point in the 1970s to its peak in 2006 it jumped from 115 to 970.  In sum, 
if during the ‘Keynesian-liberal’ period the ‘American Dream’ seemed to belong to 
the majority of the US population, it has since been hijacked by a rather tiny 
minority – for the rest, it has only been available on credit…  
At the same time, this huge income polarisation – between 1980 and 2006 
just the taxable income of the top 1% increased by nearly US$2 trillion, and that of 
the top 10% by US$3.5 trillion – obviously became one of the major contributors 
(and one probably more important than the Asian ‘savings glut’) to the increased 
liquidity in the US financial markets (the abundance of which transformed financial 
markets into fundamentally unstable institutions, totally unable to self-correct.  In 
fact, the current crisis may have many roots, but (as discussed in more detail 
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below) a crucial one relates to income polarisation.  In particular, as Figure 10 
indicates (and as good old-fashioned Keynesian economics has always emphasised) 
the current crisis has again shown that developments in financial markets are 
closely related to the distribution of income, so the latter is a crucial component in 
the understanding of the crisis and in the planning of how to get out of it.   
FIGURE 10 
 
●  fin assets = value of financial assets as percentage of GDP; and top 10% = income 
share of the top 10% (includes realised capital gains).  3-year moving averages.  Sources: 
Piketty and Sáez (2003), and US Federal Reserve (2009).  
 
It could be argued, however, that this is a case of simultaneous causation; the rich 
own most financial assets, and anything that causes the value of financial assets to 
rise rapidly will also cause inequality to rise fast.  However, this close relationship 








●  As Figure 10 (excluding capital gains).  3-year moving averages.  
 
In fact, the only time when the two series temporarily diverge is a short period that 
starts in October 1987 with ‘Black Monday’ (the largest one-day decline in stock 
market history).  However, this ‘glitch’ was soon reversed and both series returned 
to their long-standing common path – that is, like an experienced tango-dancing 
partnership, after suffering a minor hitch, these two series are able to return swiftly 
to their long-standing ‘cointegration’. 
This close relationship between developments in financial markets and 
distributional outcomes (even when they exclude capital gains) will be the subject of 
Section 5; but let us first attempt to deconstruct in Section 4 the ‘art’ of achieving 





4.-  How to achieve the new legitimisation of capital and how to develop 
the technologies of power with the required degree of sophistication to 
sustain it 
 
Understanding what neo-liberalism is really about, and clarifying its rôle in bringing 
about the current global financial crisis, requires more than simply highlighting how 
it brought about an extreme income polarisation while avoiding the political and 
social tensions likely to emerge with such a remarkable process within a democracy, 
and how this income inequality was somehow closely associated with an increased 
financial ‘fragility’.  It also requires an understanding of how this process of 
dispossession was part and parcel of a wider attempt by some capitalists (especially 
rentiers from financial capital, and from the ‘mature’ and the most polluting 
industries of the previous techno-economic paradigm), some politicians and 
intellectual networks to discipline the state and to transform capitalism into a 
system with minimal ‘compulsions’ for big business.  The unintended result, of 
course, was to transform it into an emasculated, ‘sub-prime’ economic system that 
not only lost a great deal of its capacities to develop the productive forces of 
society, but also became particularly prone to accumulating ever-increasing financial 
fragilities.  It is from this perspective that the current crisis can also be understood 
as the markets bursting the ‘ideological bubble’ that characterised the neo-liberal 
economic and political experiment.  That is, that the global financial crisis took place 
when the ‘end of history’-type neo-liberal manic discourse was brought down to 
earth by market’s law of gravity.31 
The remarkable income polarisation of the neo-liberal period (particularly in 
the US) does not seem to give much support to the Foucauldian proposition that the 
new form of ‘governmentality’ sought by neo-liberalism, even though it can be 
contingently used for the legitimation of increased inequalities, is not about that by 
necessity.  Instead, it seems to support the narrative that emphasises that neo-
liberalism is mostly a (particularly effective) new technology of dispossession.  From 
this perspective, a crucial mechanism for setting in motion this transformation was 
                                   
31  Only six months before the collapse of A.I.G., Joe Cassano, its chief financial officer, said 
of the US$441 billion portfolio of CDS’s he had bet on that "[i]t is hard for us, without being 
flippant, to even see a scenario within any kind of realm of reason that would see us losing 
one dollar in any of those transactions" (quoted in Schreiber, 2009).  See also Shnayerson, 
(2009).  
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rather ingenious: the reintroduction of risk and the heightening of uncertainty at the 
heart of a by then too self-confident ‘welfarised’ population and a (supposedly) too 
autonomous state.32  In fact, the neo-liberal counter-revolution could thus be 
understood as a deliberate attempt to shift the economy (and much else) from a 
‘stable’ to a somehow ‘unstable’ equilibrium.  That is, a movement away from 
Keynesian attempts to manage risk and reduce uncertainty via national and 
international policy coordination, closed capital accounts, stable exchange rates, low 
and stable interest rates, low levels of unemployment and unemployment benefits 
for those out of work, public health services and the other aspects of the welfare 
state, and a state autonomous enough to be capable of at least some ‘disciplining’ of 
the capitalist élite, towards an intended movement in reverse.  And this as a means 
to an end: to try to develop an environment in which capital could exercise both a 
more effective politics of dispossession and a more rent-seeking form of 
accumulation. 
What some capitalists, politicians and intellectual networks thought best for 
capitalist development was that capital should regain the upper hand via an 
economic environment that was permanently unstable and highly insecure for the 
majority of the population and the state.  That is, one that could have the necessary 
debilitating effect both on workers and the state.  In this kind of environment, a 
highly mobile and malleable factor of production (especially finance capital) would 
have an unrivalled power to thrive.   
In short, when ‘excessive’ Keynesian macro-stabilities, government 
regulations (such as tougher competition laws, more effective financial regulation, 
strong capital controls and greater accounting transparencies), labour-securities and 
social safety nets laid the grounds for both an increased degree of ‘compulsion’ for 
capital, and a significant challenge to its legitimacy by large segments of society, 
what capital urgently needed was the reintroduction of risk and the spiralling of 
uncertainty right into the soul of what were by then rather too self-assured 
‘welfarised’ institutions and populations.  So what was needed was a return to an 
environment in which the state had to live permanently under the logic of a ‘state of 
                                   
32  Neo-liberals seem to have been the only political group who really understood Kalecki’s 
main message in his 1943 article on the ‘Political aspects of full employment’: capitalism just 
cannot endure the political consequences of sustained periods of full employment.  
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emergency’ (see especially Arantes, 2007); and a return to precarious jobs, higher 
levels of unemployment, highly-constrained unions, increasingly porous safety-nets, 
insufficient and insecure pensions and so on – and, of course, high levels of 
persecutory personal debt could also be of great help.33  The bottom line was thus 
the question of how to reconstruct an economic and institutional scenario in which 
everybody knew that capital could pull the plug whenever it wanted to. 
As Tony Lawson has argued:  
“[...] a central and great Darwinian insight is that a subset of members of a 
population may come to flourish relative to other members simply because 
they possess a feature, which others do not, that renders them relatively 
suited to some local environment.  The question of the intrinsic worth of 
those who flourish most is not relevant to the story” (Lawson, 2003, p. 251).   
 
Natural selection mechanisms of this sort help us understand what the neo-liberal 
discourse is really about: it is about an attempt to create an economic environment 
best suited to those features that capital has and others do not.  In the jungle, 
capital is king!  
The neo-liberal discourse may have burst onto the political scene in the 
1970s promoting ‘order’, market efficiency and a new concept of the state based on 
freedom, individual initiative and sound macroeconomics, and about fighting 
paternalism.  However, this discourse ended up being as transparent as a bank’s 
balance-sheets since what was actually on offer for workers and the state was life 
‘on the edge’ – as in a high-risk and unstable ‘order’ only capital could thrive.  
In developing countries the challenge for capital to develop more 
sophisticated forms of legitimacy and new technologies of dispossession was much 
greater: in the new complexities of a post-Cold-War scenario, just having a Pinochet 
or two may not do any longer.  As it happened, in many developing countries 
(especially in Latin America and South Africa) the new process of legitimisation of 
capital has been so remarkably successful, and the new technologies of power so 
effective, that neo-liberalism has been able to turn the tables on progressive forces 
and has become (‘low-intensity’) liberal-democracy’s best friend…   
                                   
33  Much has been said of Mrs Thatcher’s attempt to create a ‘property-owning’ democracy; it 
would be more appropriate to call it a ‘mortgage-owning’ democracy.  Krugman (2005) calls 
it ‘the debt-peonage society’. 
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Before neo-liberalism was able to become hegemonic via a ‘spontaneous 
consensus’ scenario (which in some countries, such as Chile, took a long time, and 
included periods in which brutal dictatorships imposed their own ‘not-so-
spontaneous-consensus’ brand of neo-liberalism), in developing countries capital 
always saw democracy as its main threat.  However, following the success of its new 
form of legitimisation, and helped by the collapse of most opposition, the 
remarkably precarious life of most of the working population, and the weakness of a 
state mostly reduced to a ‘fire-fighting’ rôle (i.e., having to live constantly under the 
logic of a ‘state of emergency’), ‘low-intensity’ democracy (as opposed to popular or 
radical democracy) has become a crucial component of capital’s new technology of 
power to rule and dispossess the working population, and to restrain the state and 
to subject it to greater market accountability. 
In other words, developing countries are the best example of how neo-
liberalism in practice contains elements of both narratives, the Marxian and the 
Foucauldian.  On the one hand, what was discussed above gives strong support to 
Foucault’s main proposition: neo-liberalism is not a set of economic policies but a 
new and more effective technology of power.  On the other, the capitalist élite, 
mainly because of its intrinsically rentier nature and the lack of credible opposition, 
instead of using this new technology of power for its intended ‘rationalising' effects, 
ended up misusing it just to support more effective forms of dispossession and more 
rentier forms of accumulation.  This has transformed capitalism into a (‘sub-prime’) 
system with much-reduced capacities to develop the productive forces of society – 
i.e., one that has lost most of its only historical legitimacy.  
From this perspective, the good governance agenda of the World Bank – with 
its call for the ‘de-politicisation’ of the state, the ‘independence’ of crucial 
government institutions such as central banks, increased ‘transparency’, 
‘accountability’ and so on – is part of an attempt at disciplining and rationalising 
state action along free market principles (as in a Foucauldian narrative).  However, 
as long as all forms of opposition continue to be so weak, the life of most of the 
working population so precarious, and the state so caught up in its fire-fighting rôle, 
‘good-governance’ democracy becomes an effective institutional structure both to 
chart the whole of the state’s actions on the ‘rentier will’ of the capitalist élite 
(including helping their ‘minimalist’ approach to ‘compulsions’) and to make possible 
such a remarkable ‘dispossession feat’ within a democracy.   
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In sum, ‘low-intensity’ democracy becomes in practice a successful 
instrument to block any attempt to implement a progressive nationalist development 
agenda, or the exercise of a Keynesian or of more radical forms of state agency.  
That is, it becomes a valuable insurance against any significant challenge to the 
rent-seeking practices of big business, and against any meaningful challenge to the 
new attempts at country-subordination.  In this respect, for oligopolistic capital low-
intensity liberal-democracy replaces the rôle of military regimes as an effective 
hedge against the risk that a new political élite (including, of course, the ‘new left’) 
might come to power and threaten their brand of rent-based capitalism.  That is, the 
new ‘democratic’ agenda of capital ensures that the state will fulfil its sole function 
of reproducing the new capitalist system, and could not possibly become a threat to 
the (ineffective) functioning of unregulated markets, or exert restraint on some of 
its most detrimental rent-seeking tendencies or financial manias.  
In terms of Marxian debates, neo-liberal low-intensity democracy becomes a 
‘Poulantzas-type’ strategy (as opposed to a Miliband ‘social-network’ one) in the 
sense of providing a structural mechanism to ensure that state actions (including 
economic policies) will not deviate from their goal of promoting its own brand of 
unregulated market, irrespective of which ruling élite is in power.34  It is a structural 
mechanism to ensure that state action will remain linked to a particular ideological 
agenda.  In fact, in the new framework even the legitimacy of the state becomes 
linked to the effectiveness to which it adheres to the logic of unregulated markets. 
In terms of the rôle of increased risk in all this, a Foucauldian analysis would 
emphasise instead that neo-liberalism is not about increased risk per se, but about 
deploying a different understanding of risk – and of the ensuing social institutions that 
should regulate it.  As Donzelot (1991) noted, it is about a modified conception of 
social risk, which shifts the emphasis from the principle of collective indemnification of 
                                   
34  Perhaps the ideological epiphany of the ‘new left’ in Latin America (and other parts of the 
developing and industrialised worlds) could be understood partly along these lines: as it 
believes that in this new framework it cannot get political power to implement its own 
progressive agenda (or, as in South Africa, believing that it may be possible to get it but not 
sustain it without major economic and political upheavals), it then tries to gain power to 
implement someone else’s economic agenda (see Palma, 2009a; for the related concept of 
‘upside-down hegemony’, see Oliveira, 2006).  In fact, Mrs Thatcher once branded ‘New 
Labour’ as "my finest creation" (see Palma (2009A).  Likewise, perhaps the greatest political 
achievement of Pinochet and other dictators of that time is the proliferation of Latin American 
‘neo-liberal-lefts’ – with their façade of ‘modernity’ and their manic managerial defences as 
tactical discursive strategies acquired on their Road to Damascus.  
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the consequences of risks to an emphasis on the individual civic obligation to 
moderate the burden of risk he or she imposes on society.  As such, neo-liberalism 
might in the end have led to an increase in risk, but as a theory it attempted to justify 
the dismantling of earlier Keynesian forms of social risk management through new 
conceptions of risk and the rôle of individuals in dealing with it. 
Another important element of the analysis of the Foucauldian tradition is that 
although for all liberal perspectives ‘markets’ are a superior form of social 
organisation, there are crucial differences between a classical liberal and a neo-liberal 
understanding of the markets.  For the former, markets are a ‘quasi-natural’ reality 
(whose laws have to be respected by the state), whereas for the latter the markets 
are historical constructions that must be constantly supported by a strong political 
agency of active governance (in this and what follows, see Frangie, 2008).  
Accordingly, for classical liberalism the state and the markets each have their own 
space, separate from one another.  For neo-liberalism, in contrast, the distinction 
between the space of the state and that of the markets disappears; so the state 
(and everything else) should be mapped out as a function (or as a sub-set) of 
unregulated markets.  
This view, of course, is not only different from that of classical liberalism, but is 
also the opposite of the Keynesian-style liberal understanding of the rôle of the state, 
in which the relative autonomy of the state is the most critical governance issue; this 
autonomy is essential for the state to be able to improve upon the sub-optimal 
equilibria brought about (at best) by unregulated markets (with its many market 
failures), and for the state to protect society from the excesses of ‘free’ markets – in 
particular to protect those who become redundant to the logic of capital accumulation.  
For neo-liberals, meanwhile, market failures are not innate to the logic of capital but 
have a purely contingent historical nature.  As such, the market economy is ‘open’ 
and should be facilitated through politico-institutional agency.   
So, for example, Bush asks polluters to write environmental regulation.  And 
when ‘New Labour’ Gordon Brown (as newly appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer) 
created in 1997 a new regulatory body for the financial industry, the Financial Service 
Authority (FSA), he sets it up not only as an ‘independent non-governmental body’ 
(i.e., a company limited by guarantee), but one that is actually financed by the 
financial services industry; furthermore, he appointed ex-bankers as Chairman and as 
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Chief Executive Officer.  That is, he set the FSA up as operationally independent of 
Government, funded entirely by the financial corporations it is supposed to regulate, 
and led by financial-industry insiders.  As became evident after the onset of the 
current financial crisis, the FSA had been acting more as a ‘service provider’ to the 
financial industry than as an industry regulator.  Moreover, (as well as granting him a 
knighthood) the British Prime Minister appointed the former CEO of a bank that had 
collapsed with the crisis as deputy chairman of the FSA – I suppose the idea was that 
convicted felons make the best prison guards…35  
Thus, New Labour found a rather ingenious solution to the problem of 
‘regulatory capture’; if lobbyist and industry inevitably succeed in capturing the 
regulators, why not make them the regulators in the first place?  If all that matters is 
self-regulation and market discipline, why bother with unnecessary government 
meddling in the economy?36  Not surprisingly, self-regulation became freedom to run 
amok, and market discipline became irrational exuberance.  
The main issue here is the reversal of the Keynesian logic of the interaction 
between political power and the dynamics of unregulated markets.  Among other 
things, this reversal brought to an end the rôle of the state as a ‘constrainer’ of the 
rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital (in order to foster competition).  The 
neo-liberal attempt to project the logic of unregulated markets into the heart of 
government created a de facto situation in which the new rôle of the state became 
one of a facilitator of the rent-seeking practices of big business.  In fact, for liberals of 
the classical tradition (and liberal-Keynesians) governments had to preserve 
competition, because “[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for 
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the 
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices”.  (Smith, 1776).  In practice, when 
people of the same trade meet together to conspire against the public, neo-liberal 
                                   
35  Brown appointed Sir James Crosby to the FSA in December 2007, two years after Crosby 
– then the chief executive of Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) and already a non-executive 
director of the FSA – had sacked a member of his staff who warned him that the FSA’s rules 
(for whose design he was partly responsible) were being broken at his own bank!  (See: 
http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/latestnews/Brown-on-spot-as-former.4971845.jp). 
36  According to Brown, his policy on financial regulation was “[n]ot just a light touch, but a 
limited touch” (see http://www.cbi.org.uk/ndbs/press.nsf/0363c1f07c6ca12a8025671c0038 
1cc7/ee59d1c32ce4ec12802570c70041152c?).  And, according to the present British 
Chancellor, this policy should not be changed now as “current financial regulation is not to 
blame for the credit crunch” (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8104340.stm).  
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governments (especially those of the ‘new’ left) don’t just turn a blind eye, they end 
up setting the table, cooking the meal, serving the drinks, and paying the bill…  The 
irony is that in the end both Keynesian-liberalism and neo-liberalism ended up 
implementing a similar strong agency from the state; however, that agency had a 
very different aim.   
In sum, as Foucault remarks, according to neo-liberalism what is needed is 
“[a] state under the surveillance of the market, rather than a market under the 
surveillance of the state” (2004, p. 120).  From this perspective, if for Smith and the 
Enlightenment the fundamental (anti-feudal) issue was that human beings could 
look after their own interests without the need of a King or a Church to tell them 
what to do, neo-liberal oligopolistic capital became a de facto new King, and the 
neo-liberal ideology a de facto new Church, that again is able (and eager) to tell 
people and the state what to do. 
As is obvious by now, an unintended consequence of this new environment is 
that it has hugely increased the likelihood that capitalism would be even more crisis-
ridden from within.  That is, especially the wide-ranging financial liberalisation 
policies at a global level and those of liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation at 
a local one favoured by neo-liberalism, have driven the self-destructive tendencies 
of capital to their extreme (as, among other things, in this kind of environment 
issues such as prisoner dilemmas and fallacies of compositions were brought to their 
head).37  But as in this new environment the downturns are just too horrifying even 
to contemplate, when instability got totally out of hand and became crushingly 
dysfunctional, capital, as in every good old Western, could always count on the most 
ancient rôle of the state – to call in the cavalry in the nick of time.38 
 
                                   
37  Given current events, for most people it should come as no surprise to learn that last year 
25% of countries in the world had a banking crisis.  However, more surprising would be to 
learn that that it was exactly the same percentage which was the annual average for 
countries with banking crises during the 15-year period between 1986 and 2001 (see 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008; countries are weighted by their share of world income). 
38  As has become evident in the current financial crisis, when in the business cycle the down-
swing is just too steep, the very-neo-liberal Washington Consensus also tells us (but very 
quietly) that we should all be ‘closet Keynesians’ and not allow market discipline to run its full 
course – i.e., as far as financial capital is concerned, governments should never let the chips 
fall where they may.  
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5.-  Income polarisation, ‘financialisation’, and ‘sub-prime’ capitalism – 
one with modest capacities to develop the productive forces and 
intrinsically unstable   
 
From a macroeconomic point of view, the crucial aspect of the huge increase in 
inequality and in financial ‘deepening’ was that they were associated with a meagre-
macro.  In particular, they are linked to a disappointing rate of productivity growth; 
an ever-increasing level of ‘financialisation’; a massive drop in the overall level of 
private savings; and a particularly poor rate of private investment – poor especially 
since increased inequality took place side by side with a relatively dynamic increase 
in personal consumption, high profit rates, easy finance and social tranquillity.39  
Perhaps the least surprising part of this story is the collapse in the level of personal 
saving (see Figure 12).  
FIGURE 12 
 
●  top 1% = income share of the top 1%; S/DPY = personal saving as a percentage of 
disposable personal income.  3-year moving averages.  Data on personal savings between 
1929 and 1948 are not shown due to sharp fluctuations during both the 1930s recession and 
the Second World War (the same will be the case for other figures below).  Sources: Piketty 
and Sáez (2003), and US Census Bureau (2008).  
                                   
39  For a pre-2007 crisis critical analysis of this period, see Harcourt (2006).  
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Obviously, three decades of stagnant average real income for the bottom 90%, 
coupled with a dynamic rate of growth of consumption expenditure, is not the ideal 
environment for personal saving (at least, as traditionally measured in national 
accounts).40  
Furthermore, contrary to what was widely predicted by the ‘supply-siders’ of 
the Washington Consensus, in this new neo-liberal-type capitalism a remarkable fall 
in corporate taxation led to a decline in corporate saving as a share of corporate 
profits (as opposed to what had happened for most of the ‘financially repressed’ 
Keynesian period; see Figure 13). 
FIGURE 13 
 
●  und profits/profits = undistributed corporate profits as a share of corporate profits; and 
taxes/profits = corporate taxes as a share of corporate profits.  5-year moving averages.  
Source: US Census Bureau (2008). 
 
                                   
40  As shown in Figure 23 below, households enjoyed a huge increase in net worth after 1980.  
As individuals feel richer, they may have well deceived themselves into believing that their 
‘permanent’ income was growing rapidly by adding unrealised asset appreciation to their 
actual cash flow.  That is, if individuals spend a relatively fixed proportion of their perceived 
income, their spending as a fraction of their income flows would tend to rise in periods of 
asset inflation.  Thus, their conventionally GDP-measured savings rate would fall.   
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So, despite the many positive things that were predicted to happen if taxes on high-
income groups and big corporations were to be cut, what actually happened is 
further evidence that (at best) “[i]t turns out that when you cut taxes on the rich, 
the rich pay less taxes; when you raise taxes on the rich, they pay more taxes – end 
of story”.41 
The combined effect of the collapse of personal savings and the decline in 
corporate saving led, of course, to a huge decline in the overall level of private 
saving – as a share of gross national income net private savings fell from 11.2% in 
1984 to 3.3% in 2006.  However, the really remarkable nature of this neo-liberal – 
and ever more financially rent-seeking – type of capitalism is revealed in the 
relationship between income polarisation and private investment (see Figure 14). 
FIGURE 14 
 
●  top 1% = income share of the top 1%; priv inv = private investment as a percentage of 
GDP (current prices; excludes private inventories).  3-year moving averages.  Sources: 
Piketty and Sáez (2003), and US Census Bureau (2008). 
 
                                   
41  See http://select.nytimes.com/2007/09/10/opinion/10krugman.html?hp. 
 42
Even having said all of the above, it is still truly remarkable to see how private 
investment failed to respond positively to the combined incentives of huge income 
polarisation cum political stability and dynamic growth of personal consumption, 
high profit rates, and overabundance of finance.  Private investment instead actually 
declined as a share of GDP, falling cyclically from its peak of 18.5% of GDP in 1979, 
to just 15.5% in 2007.42  In fact, what happened to investment during the neo-
liberal period challenges all available economic theories of investment.  Low levels of 
investment were also a key component of Greenspan’s ‘conundrum’.  That is, and 
not for the first time, we are faced with a ‘macro’ that only makes analytical sense if 
examined within the framework of the political settlement and distributional 
outcome in which it operates.  
Figure 14 helps us in this direction by also revealing the changing nature of 
the process of accumulation between the Keynesian and the neo-liberal periods.  In 
the former, the increased ‘compulsions’ for big business and the declining shares of 
income for top earners had forced the capitalist élite to accumulate via increasing 
productive capacities and moving away from sheer surplus extraction; this (more 
productive) orientation was also helped by the fact that the prevailing techno-
economic paradigm was still in its ‘deployment’ phase.  The latter period, in 
contrast, is characterised by a ‘scissor’ movement in reverse (see Figure 14 above), 
in which growing income inequality and lower ‘compulsion’ for big business took 
place side by side with a declining share of investment – at a time when the fourth 
techno-economic paradigm was becoming relatively exhausted, and the complex 
‘installation’ phase of the new one was still taking shape.  Figure 15 (like Section 1 
above) also shows how the post-1980 process of ‘financialisation’ led to an 
increasing decoupling between the real and financial worlds.  
                                   
42 In a recent assessment of the Bush administration, written as a column for the Wall Street 
Journal, Karl Rove states that: “Mr. Bush […] cut taxes on capital, investment and savings. 
The result was 52 months of growth” (2009, 3).  But there is not much evidence in the real 




●  fin assets = total financial assets (all sectors); and priv inv = private investment 
(excludes private inventories).  Both series are expressed as percentage of GDP.  3-year 
moving averages.  Sources: US Census Bureau (2008), and US Federal Reserve (2009). 
 
During the period of so-called ‘financial repression’ that followed the Bretton Woods 
agreement in 1944, total financial assets remained relatively stable as a share of 
GDP for about three decades (at a level of about 500%), while private investment 
experienced some acceleration (the two extreme points in the cycle were 13.8% of 
GDP in 1961 and 18.5% in 1979).  The subsequent period of ‘financial liberalisation’, 
a period of huge asset inflation (that more than doubled the value of total financial 
assets as a share of GDP) was accompanied by a slowdown of the rate of private 
investment (from 18.5% of GDP in 1979 to 15.5% in 2007).  During this period the 
value of financial assets not only decoupled from the real economy, but the 
abundance of finance and the associated asset-price-led (not so) ‘irrational 
exuberance’, instead of having a positive pulling effect on private investment, had 
instead the effect of ‘friendly fire’.43  Therefore, there is not much evidence here to 
                                   
43  According to Keynes, the reversal of the relationship between financial and productive 
capital was also essential for the recovery of the 1930s crisis: “[t]here cannot be a real 
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support the McKinnon and Shaw-type argument in favour of financial liberalisation – 
one of the most influential ideas behind the emergence of the Washington 
Consensus (see Chesnais, 2002, and Epstein, 2005).  
As Figure 15 also indicates (as Figure 4 above has already shown), it may be 
that what financial ‘liberalisation’ was really about was an attempt at introducing a 
‘unit root’ into the post-Bretton Woods stationary financial processes; once this was 
done, then it could be (ideologically, as well as policy) ‘shocked’ with (hopefully) 
permanent upward effects… 
Furthermore, policy-makers totally ignored the damage that the 
disproportionate growth of the financial sector was inflicting on the real economy via 
a special version of the ‘Dutch disease’ – in this case, the crowding out of the non-
financial tradable sector (both exports and import-competing sectors) by the 
excessive growth of the financial sector (and of construction).44  In fact, financial 
markets were allowed to expand to such an extent that industrialised countries 
moved from a situation in which banks and other financial institutions were ‘too 
large to fail’ (e.g. LTCM in 1998), to one in which they became almost ‘too large to 
be rescued’ – at the beginning of the current crisis finance and insurance accounted 
for 8% of GDP, more than twice their share in the 1960s (with the sector called 
‘securities, commodity contracts and investments’ growing particularly fast, from 
only 0.3% of GDP in the late 1970s to 1.7% in 2007).  Also, the share of the 
financial sector in overall corporate profits increased from 10% to about one-third 
between 1986 and 2006.  In turn, the list of stocks making up the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average did not contain a single financial company until 1982, while at the 
beginning of 2008, the Dow contained five – including such ‘citadels’ as AIG, 
Citigroup and Bank of America (see Krugman, 2009A). 
And since capitalism without compulsions and excess finance is probably as 
efficient as Communism without workers’ control over the bureaucracy, it should 
probably come as no surprise that the ‘collateral damage’ of all of the above is 
productivity growth (see Figure 16).  
                                                                                                           
recovery, in my judgment, until the ideas of lenders and the ideas of productive borrowers 
are brought together again. […] Seldom in modern history has the gap between the two been 
so wide and so difficult to bridge” (1931, p. 146; also quoted in Perez 2002, 167). 
44  See Buiter (2009A); for analyses of the ‘Dutch Disease’, see Rowthorn and Coutts (2004), 




●  Percentages shown in the graph are average annual real rates of growth in respective 
periods (1950-66, 1966-83, and 1983-08); this periodisation is due to the productivity cycle 
having two phases during the ‘Golden Age’.  Percentages in brackets correspond to 
productivity per-hour worked for the same periods.  3-year moving averages.  Source: 
GGDC (2009). 
  
In fact, as Figure 16 indicates, the much heralded GDP growth-acceleration in the 
US after 1983 is not that much more dramatic than a couple of decimal points’ 
improvement from the average growth rate of the previous period (characterised by 
profit-squeezes and stagflations – 3.1% between 1983 and 2008 and 2.8% between 
1966 and 1983).  Nonetheless, as this minor increase came together with a drop in 
employment creation (from 1.8% to 1.4%, respectively), productivity growth 
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seemed to have increased significantly (from an average of 1% to one of 1.7%).  
Yet some of the huge amount of the Amazon that was deforested to keep up with 
publications regarding this acceleration of productivity growth could have been 
spared if productivity had been looked at from the point of view of output per hour-
worked (rather than output per worker).  From this more accurate perspective, all 
that happened was just a one decimal point boost (i.e., a change from an average of 
1.6% to one of 1.7%...).45  And in TFP terms, despite some mild recovery during the 
Clinton years, productivity growth was equally disappointing – TFP not in the (not 
very useful) traditional Solow-residual sense, but in the sense of adjusting 
productivity growth by factor accumulation following the Hall and Jones (1999) 
methodology.  In actual fact, and despite all the fuss, when the appropriate 
decomposition of output per worker is applied to the GGDC data, the 1.7% average 
rate for 1983-2008 gains a whole additional decimal point (increasing to 1.8%; see 
Acharya, 2009). 
 However, as is always the case, these average rates hide important sectoral 
differences; in the case of the US the sectoral range spans agriculture (4.4%) to 
services (0.7%).  One sector that stands out is manufacturing with an apparently 
remarkable 4.1% average productivity growth during this period (up from 2.4% for 
1966-83).  However, this impressive rate has a significant ‘factor composition bias’ 
as this sector lost no less than one quarter of its labour force between the election 
of Reagan and 2008 (i.e., 5.5 million jobs) – cricket would be a very different game 
if tests were decided not on runs and wickets but on top batting averages; i.e., if 
teams could get rid of some of its middle and practically all of its lower order 
batting…  
In turn, Figures 17 and 18 again show how the changing relationship between 
income distribution and private investment (found first above in Figure 14) evolved 
through the political cycle, but this time from the perspective of the ‘rebound effect’ 
of the multiple between these two variables.  
                                   
45  One day someone will explain why the neo-liberal ideology was so successful in shrinking 
people’s ambitions and expectations…   In fact, the rate of productivity growth (per hour-
worked) in the US between 1983 and 2008 (1.7%) was lower than that of Japan (2.4%), and 
the United Kingdom (2.2%); it was also lower than that of smaller industrialised countries 
such as Ireland (3.1%), Finland (2.7%), Norway (2.3%), Austria (2.2%) and Sweden 
(1.8%).  And it was identical to that of Germany despite all the upheaval of unification (see 




●  3-year moving averages.  Source: US Census Bureau (2008).  
  
This statistic could be understood as a proxy for the changing nature of the process 
of accumulation; i.e., for the changing relationship between what top income 
earners take away from the economy and what they put back into it in terms of 
improved productive capacities.  In fact, towards the end of the period this 
relationship had changed so much that even the income share of the top 0.5% (i.e., 
only about seven hundred thousand families, earning 18.6% of the total in 2006) 
ended up well above the share of all private investment in GDP (15.5%). 
Finally, probably no other statistic communicates better the increasingly rent-
seeking nature of the capitalist élite during the neo-liberal period in the US than that 




●  argent. = Argentina; mal & thai = Malaysia and Thailand.  3-year moving averages.  
Sources: US Census Bureau (2008), and WDI (2008).46  
 
It seems that the main aim of the neo-liberal capitalist élite in the US was to create 
a ‘post-industrial’ capitalism – one with only carrots but no sticks for the capitalist 
élite, where, among other things, productive investment could become an optional 
extra on top of assured rent-earnings opportunities and increased surplus 
extraction.  And also probably no other statistic demonstrates better than that in 
Figure 18 how the US seems to be increasingly in a state of ‘projective identification’ 
with Latin American-style capitalism (see Palma, 2009B).  That is, neo-liberalism 
also ended up as a de facto mechanism for bringing middle-income developing 
countries’ institutional structures and distributional outcomes into industrialised 
countries.47  In sum, US rentiers did certainly succeed in their attempt to get rid of 
                                   
46  Note that the income distribution data from the US come from a different source to those 
of the other countries – i.e., in the former from tax returns and in the latter from household 
surveys.  See also TDR (1997). 
47  In the Preface to the first edition of Das Kapital Marx says that “[t]he country that is more 
developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future” (Marx, 
1867).  Well, maybe at that time, but not any more – now it seems to be the other way 
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practically all obstacles to their greed.  When the market eventually called their 
bluff, it became evident just how self-destructive and short-sighted this strategy had 
been. 
 
6.-  Six key ‘rent-seeking-à-la-post-modern’ dynamics that characterised 
the neo-liberal paradigm  
 
This section discusses six rent-seeking dynamics that will help to illustrate the rôle 
that neo-liberalism played, as it was de facto applied in the real world, in the current 
global financial crisis. 
 
6.1  Greenspan-style virtual wealth creation  
 
According to what I call the first neo-liberal rent-seeking economic law, there is 
supposed to be no fundamental difference between what was happening in the 
paper (casino) economy and in the real economy.  Therefore, the increase in net 
worth resulting from asset price inflation (even if it is only based on unlimited 
growth of finance) is tantamount to real wealth creation.  For example, Figure 19 
shows that since 1980 there has been a complete breakdown of the long-standing 
relationship between corporate capitalisation and the replacement cost of fixed (or 
tangible) assets – i.e., between the value of corporate equities and bonds and the 










                                                                                                           




●  capitalisation = total corporate capitalisation (equities and bonds); tang assets = 
replacement cost of tangible assets.  Percentages are average annual real rates of growth 
between 1980-2007 (but in the case of capitalisation it excludes the two years of the collapse 
of the technology bubble; i.e., they are the growth rates between 1980-1999, and 2001-
2007).  3-year moving averages.  Source: Bichler and Nitzan (2009). The market value of 
equities and bonds is net of foreign holdings by US residents. 
 
Between 1932 and 1956 both series (with different cycles) had a similar overall 
average annual rate of growth (8%); then corporate capitalisation surged ahead 
until the 1973 oil crisis, when the stagflation that followed overcorrected this 
asymmetry.  Finally, from the early 1980s until the 2007 crisis the annual real rate 
of growth of corporate capitalisation nearly trebled that of the replacement cost of 
fixed assets.  In fact, even the collapse of the ‘dotcom’ bubble in 1999 did not have 
much long-lasting effect.48  In turn, Figure 20 shows the changing pattern of the 
ratio between these two variables (representing one version of the ‘Tobin’s Q’).  
 
                                   
48  On why the collapse of the ‘dotcom’ bubble was not enough to bring an end to the casino 




●  Tobin’s Q = ratio of the value of corporate capitalization to that of the replacement cost of 
tangible assets.  3-year moving averages.  Source: Bichler and Nitzan (2009).   
 
It is not unreasonable to expect that the capitalisation of a corporation should 
represent the value of its entire productive capacity (that of its tangible and non-
tangible assets).  However, the ‘Tobin’s Q’ only captures the ratio between 
capitalisation and the value of tangible assets – i.e., between the whole and only 
one of its parts.  Therefore, under ‘normal’ circumstances this ratio should be 
greater than 1.  The question is, by how much?  Here is where a distorted version of 
the ‘knowledge economy’-type discourse comes to the rescue of rentiers and 
bubble-blowers.  What was happening in equity markets was absolutely not a bubble 
due to the practically unlimited growth of finance; it was simply the markets doing 
their job properly – i.e., pricing the ever-increasing value of intangible assets 
accurately (intangible assets such as intellectual property rights, firm-specific 
knowledge, proprietary technology, goodwill and other ‘metaphysical’ assets).  In 
short, from a real business cycle perspective all that was supposed to be happening 
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was an efficient market response to an exogenous transformation in the real 
(knowledge-based) economic environment.  Bubble?  What bubble?  
In fact, according to a study by Standard & Poor, this ‘intangible revolution’ 
meant that the value of intangibles grew from 17% of total corporate assets in 
1975, to 80% in 2005 (for a detailed analysis of this issue, see Bichler and Nitzan, 
2009).  What is ironic is that if this were true, the recent collapse of the stock 
market should be interpreted as the markets pricing down the value of corporate 
sector intangible productive capacities by more than half.49   
In turn, ‘Greenspan-style virtual wealth creation’ meant that between 1982 
and 2007 households’ net worth in the US increased by US$42 trillion, or by a factor 
of 3.  Basically, each had its net worth increased on average by about US$400,000 – 
or by 12 times the average income of the bottom 90%.50  Conversely, since the 
bubble blew up, the average net worth of households has declined by US$130,000, 
or by an amount larger than the average household debt.  In fact, as a share of 
personal disposable income, by mid-2009 household net worth had reverted to 
where it was during the third quarter of 1992. 
  
6.2  No need for financial markets to be either boring or small 
 
According to the second rent-seeking economic law of neo-liberalism, there is 
nothing as magical as financial markets, and nothing as valuable as the skills of the 
wizards who perform that magic (otherwise known as the new masters/mistresses 
of the universe, the new jugglers of perpetual profits).  With the advent of neo-
liberalism, gone were the years when “[b]anks attracted depositors by providing 
convenient branch locations and maybe a free toaster or two; [… and then] they 
used the money thus attracted to make loans, and that was that” (Krugman, 
2009A).  And gone were the years when finance and insurance together accounted 
for less than 4% of GDP, and when the list of stocks making up the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average did not contain a single financial company.   
 However, with the deregulation-minded neo-liberal era, “[o]ld-fashioned 
banking was increasingly replaced by wheeling and dealing on a grand scale.” 
                                   
49  On the crash of the ‘knowledge economy’, see Pagano and Rossi (2009).  
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(Krugman, 2009A).  In fact, even using Geithner’s definition of ‘banking’, by 2007 
more than half of US’s banking was being handled by (what he likes to call) a 
“parallel financial system” – better known as “shadow banking” (a term coined by 
Paul McCulley in August 2007 at a Fed’s annual symposium). 
In a way, the logic of an increasingly unregulated financial market was 
remarkably simple.  More financial innovation of the ‘slicing, dicing and repackaging 
financial claims’ type, and more volume, resulted in more fees and more 
underwriting, which in turn led to more profits.51  The quality of the assets became 
just an optional extra.  And the securitisation food chain went on: mortgages 
become ABSs, ABSs became CDOs (of different tranches), CDOs became CDOs-
Squared, CDOs-Squared became CDOs-Cubed (by this time not a soul had a clue as 
to the repetition of exposures in the underlying CDOs), and then even higher CDOs; 
and the game of Monopoly went on and on.52  In turn, CDOs also took the form of 
CLOs, CBOs, CSOs, SFCDOs, CRECDOs and CIOs.  At each step there were fat fees 
and more underwriting, and (of course) many opportunities to transfer the risk to 
someone else down the line – “from those who understand it a little to those who do 
not understand it at all.”53  Or, as Stiglitz puts it, “[g]lobalization opened up 
opportunities to find new people to exploit their ignorance.  And we found them."54  
That is, a new (post-modern-type) Robin Hood was born: one that robs the rich to 
give it to the very rich… 
                                                                                                           
50  See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current.  
51  Even before the beginning of the 2007 crisis, Lehman was already leveraged to the tune of 
22 times its net worth (see McDonald and Robinson, 2009).  
52  In 2003 Merrill Lynch only had US$3.4 billion in CDOs; by 2006 it posted US$44 billion in 
sub-prime CDOs and sub-prime mortgage bonds (a figure higher than its entire shareholders' 
equity value).  By then, fees that flowed from financing CDOs reached $700 million.   
Furthermore, despite the fact that this huge position was even unhedged, ratings agencies 
still gave Merrill Lynch a solid investment grade.  Had executives of Merrill, or of those 
helpful rating agencies, being involved in other professions (such as doctors or lawyers), by 
2008 perhaps measures would have been taken to strike them off their professional 
registers.  However, as these are financial markets, despite heavy losses (US$27 billion) and 
the exposure of what has been going on, the total bonus pool of Merrill in 2008 still reached 
US$3.6 billion (with the top four recipients alone receiving a total of US$121 million).  See 
Crotty (2009).  Moreover, a former chief investment strategist at Merrill Lynch thinks that he 
is still in a position to preach – writing in the Financial Times he complains that all what 
current government actions is doing is “slowing the economy’s dynamism and increasing 
rigidity”…  (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1f64e9b6-7559-11de-9ed5-00144feabdc0. html).  
53  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/business/26norris.html?hp.   
54  http://www.newsweek.com/id/207390/output/print.  
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  In a recent article, Robert Skidelsky explains: “[…] in contrast to the dot-
com boom, it is difficult to identify the technological ‘shock’ that set off the 
[subsequent] boom.  Of course, the upswing was marked by superabundant credit.  
But this was not used to finance new inventions: it was the invention.  It was called 
securitized mortgages.  It left no monuments to human invention, only piles of 
financial ruin” (Skidelsky 2009, 2). 
Also, financial innovations aimed at increased lack of transparency was often 
the name of the game as there were huge rewards for helping corporations to take 
“risk off-balance sheet, where it is not as readily observed and monitored”, and for 
helping them to “dodge taxes and accounting rules.”(ibid.).  There were also 
financial companies that specialised in providing money managers and hedge funds 
with fast-trade execution (often with an ‘immediate or cancel’ feature) that insure 
that the trades cannot be traced.55  These hidden stock-trading venues, also known 
as ‘dark pools’ (in part because the trading takes place away from any exchange 
and therefore without any reports being filed) have captured an increasingly large 
share of US equity volume in recent years.  “The leading "dark pool" is Goldman 
Sachs' "Sigma X," which executed about 162 million external orders in April 2008” 
(Ibid.).   
In the meantime, the financial sector ended up generating about a third of all 
corporate profits in the US.  No wonder gambling was one of the few industries 
struggling during the boom years – who needs Las Vegas if we have Wall Street's 
casinos offering so much more fun and hugely improved odds?56  
The key point here is the delusion that all these financial rent-seeking and 
corrupt dynamics were sustainable, and that they were making a positive 
contribution to growth.  However, as is now patently clear:  
“[…] the wizards were frauds, whether they knew it or not, and their magic turned 
out to be no more than a collection of cheap stage tricks.  Above all, the key 
                                   
55  See, for example,  http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/14/news/companies/sergey_ 
aleynikov_getco_goldman.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2009071510.  
56  Those better odds reflected the fact that, as opposed to a normal casino, there were no 
near zero-sum games in Wall Street – if you win, the casino also wins (as they work on fees 
and virtual performance...).  In fact (and with apologies to animal lovers), in a stock market 
bubble even a monkey can make money – all he or she needs to do is to buy a random 
selection of stocks (or an index-tracking one) and then hold on to them.  Besides, it is 
unlikely that a monkey would charge you exorbitant fees for doing just that.  (Probably a 
banana or two would do). 
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promise of securitization – that it would make the financial system more robust by 
spreading risk more widely – turned out to be a lie.  Banks used securitization to 
increase their risk, not reduce it, and in the process they made the economy more, 
not less, vulnerable to financial disruption.” (Krugman, 2009A)   
 
Furthermore, as discussed above, the neo-liberal discourse totally ignored the 
damage that the disproportionate growth of the financial sector was inflicting on the 
real economy via ‘Dutch disease’ crowding-out effects (it more than doubled as 
share of GDP between the 1960s and 2007).   
 
6.3  Capital accumulation via increased surplus extraction rather than 
improved productive capacities  
 
As the income distribution and investment data above clearly show, like ‘rentier 
aristocrats’ whose wealth depends on their capacity to squeeze surpluses out of 
peasants, the post-1980 neo-liberal capitalist élite in the US also preferred to 
increase its wealth by developing a more effective technology of dispossession.  
That is, by improving its own coercive powers (on top of its remarkable talents for 
creating virtual financial wealth), rather than by increasing its capacities for 
developing further the productive forces of society – let alone by taking the risks 
associated with the ‘deployment’ phase of a new ‘IT’ and ‘clean’ techno-economic 
paradigm (although bubbles associated with the installation phase of the ‘IT’ 
technological revolution would do very nicely…)  From this perspective, this third 
neo-liberal rentier economic law could also be understood as a new form of moral 
hazard: one characterised by the fundamental distortion of incentives. 
 
6.4  No need any longer for paying taxes to finance free public goods 
 
As is well known, the huge increase of the pre-tax income-share of the top income 
earners was actually accompanied by a remarkable fall in their tax-rates.  For 
example, according to an IRS (US Internal Revenue Service) report obtained by the 
Wall Street Journal, in 2005 the top 400 income-tax payers (with a combined gross 
income of more than US$100 billion) controlled 1.2% of the nation’s total taxable 
income – twice the share they had in 1995.  As if this huge increase in taxable 
income was not enough, this group also had their effective income tax rate cut by 
nearly half (from 30% to 18%; see Francis, 2008).  And the 1995 effective income 
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tax rate of this group (30%) had already been reduced by the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, which had drastically cut the top marginal income tax rates (see Feldstein, 
1995).  
Taxes on corporate profits also declined remarkably; for example, these taxes 
as a percentage of public expenditure fell from 15% of the total in 1978 to just 6% 
in 1982, while at the same time the public deficit grew by an almost identical 
converse amount (from 6% to 16% of public expenditure).  Again, by 2002 taxes on 
corporate profits were back at 6% of public expenditure, while the deficit went up 
again to 16%.  In fact, the share of taxes on corporate profits in total public 
expenditure fell below even the lowest levels reached by this ratio during the 
difficult years of the 1930s’ recession (9%).  Furthermore, as tax cuts did very little 
to stimulate the economy, real stimulation was left to the Fed, which took up the 
task with unprecedentedly low interest rates and liquidity.57 
In all, it has been estimated that the Bush tax cuts amounted to $1.8 
trillion.58  And that amount is almost identical to the US$ 1.7 trillion increase in the 
debt of the Federal Government between the beginning of the first Bush 
administration in 2001 and the start of the financial crisis in 2007 (see US Federal 
Reserve, 2009). 
So, basically this fourth neo-liberal rentier economic law could be 
summarised in the following terms: rather than paying taxes to get free public 
goods, it was much more fun for the top income earners and big corporations to 
‘part-pay/part-lend’ these taxes to the government.  The end result of the delusion 
that this was a sustainable policy is that the current sum of all government liabilities 
(from Treasury bonds to Medicare and military pensions) amounts to the staggering 
figure of US$63.8 trillion.59  And if one divides this figure by the number of 
households in the US, the result is the rather shocking figure of US$547,000.  Again, 
if this debt and the household private debt were to be paid in the next 30 years, and 
even assuming a real interest rate of 0%, each household would have to contribute 
no less than US$22,274 per year – an amount equivalent to more than 70% of the 
current average annual gross income of the bottom 90%.  And this, of course, 
                                   
57  See http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/2009/01/stiglitz200901. 
58  See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/opinion/22krugman.html. 
59  See, for example, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-05-28-debt_N.htm. 
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assuming that the federal government closes the deficit, and each household does 
not incur any additional debt (both rather doubtful scenarios, to say the least).60 
Thus, as so many other things these days, the ‘part-pay-part-lend’ your taxes 
really means ‘part-pay-part-someone-else-pays’ your taxes to the government…  
Also, the current outburst of public sector liabilities in many industrialised countries 
may signal the beginning of an inevitable period of Brazilian-style public sector 
Ponzi-finance (see Palma, 2006).61  That is, following what I have always thought to 
be the first law of macroeconomics – ‘one can only solve a macroeconomic problem 
by creating another one in the hope that that one would be easier to handle’ – I 
think that it is fairly safe to predict that the roots of the next financial crisis are 
likely to be found amid the debris of the current one… 
 
6.5  No need any longer to pay the level of wages required for aggregate 
demand growth to sustain capital accumulation  
 
An obvious question that emerges from the income distribution data discussed 
above is how was it politically feasible in the US to keep the average real wage of 
the bottom 90% stagnant for 30 years?  This is an issue with many facets, with both 
carrots and sticks.  On the economic side, the carrots included the mirage of an 
ever-increasing household net worth due to asset price bubbles – which was also the 
basis for an ever-increasing access to credit (see Figure 23 below).  And on the 
political and ideological ones, these included some remarkably effective ‘bait and 
switch’ topics – e.g., the ‘refocusing passion carrots’ of what Karl Rove once called 
‘wedge issues’ (God, guns, gays, abortion, military adventures and the war on 
terror).  The sticks included the constant threat of transferring jobs to China, India 
and Mexico. 
                                   
60  See http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/05/us_debt_668621_per_household.php.  In 
turn, if the real interest rate is assumed to be 3% during this 30-year period, what each 
household would have to contribute per year rises to US$34,092; and if 5%, to US$43,469…  
61  In the UK, for example, while public sector borrowing is set to increase by £175bn during 
the current financial year, the National Audit Office has just reported that tax receipts have 
fallen by 10% in the last one - the biggest fall since 1923.  In all, as a percentage of GDP, by 
mid-2009 the total outstanding government net debt is already twice the level it had in 2004, 
and two-third higher than before the beginning of the 2007 crisis (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/ business/8160614.stm).  
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Much has been said regarding the increase in household debt before the 2007 
financial crisis, and the huge dead-weight that this is bound to bring to the eventual 
recovery.  However, not enough attention has been paid to the fact that this debt 
was essential to sustain the growth of aggregate demand in the face of stagnant 
average incomes in the bottom 90% of the population (see Figure 21). 
FIGURE 21 
 
●  PC = Personal Consumption Expenditure; and GY = gross income of the bottom 90%.62  
3-year moving averages.  Percentages are average annual real rates of growth in respective 
periods.  Source: US Census Bureau (2008).  
 
As Figure 21 indicates, the fall in the rate of growth of aggregate income of the 
bottom 90% (from 3.5% between 1950 and 1980 to 1.8% between 1980 and 2006) 
is associated with practically the same rate of growth of personal consumption 
expenditure in both periods (3.6% and 3.4%, respectively).  No prizes for guessing 
what made up the difference. 
The above gives rise to the fifth neo-liberal rent-seeking economic law: rather 
than paying the level of wages that were necessary to achieve the growth of 
aggregate demand required to sustain the process of capital accumulation, it was 
                                   
62   Note that due to lack of data, this graph compares the gross income of the bottom 90% 
with the level of personal consumption expenditure of the whole population (on this issue see 
Pollin (2005).  Also, note that in the right-hand panel the aggregate income of the bottom 
90% grows at 1.8% only due to a growing population. 
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much more fun for the capitalist élite to ‘part-pay/part-lend’ the required level of 
wages.  Figure 22 indicates the resulting huge increase in the level of household 
debt (both consumer credit and home mortgage debt) after the election of Reagan.  
FIGURE 22 
 
●  cons cred = consumer credit of households; and mortg = home mortgage debt of 
households; both series are expressed as percentage of wages and salaries.  3-year moving 
averages.  Sources: US Census Bureau (2008), and US Federal Reserve (2009).   
 
As Figure 22 shows, consumer credit of the household sector jumped from 25% to 
over 40% of wages and salaries between the early 1980s and 2007.  In turn, home 
mortgage debt soared from 65% to 166%.  And as is well known, a significant 
component of the increase in mortgage debt was devoted to finance consumption, 
because US households were allowed to transform the capital gains in their homes 
into ATM machines – home equity withdrawal reached US$700 billion in 2005 (see 
Roubini, 2009).  And all this just to keep personal consumption expenditure growing 
at about the same pace as before neo-liberalism.  
Abraham Lincoln famously said that “[y]ou can fool some of the people all of 
the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the 
people all of the time.”  Well, maybe the long household net worth bubble in the US 
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(and in many other industrialised and developing countries of the time) was the 
exception in which you could fool all of the people for rather a long time!  As 
mentioned above, one working definition of neo-liberalism could be ‘the art of 
making huge amounts of money by playing the rest of the population for suckers’… 
Figure 23 illustrates the effects of the capitalist élite’s preference to ‘part-
pay/part-lend’ the required level of wages on household debt, and the mirage of an 
ever-increasing net worth of households.  The latter not only provided the 
foundations for the ever-increasing access to credit, but was probably also a 
fundamental component of the material foundations of the neo-liberal ‘spontaneous 
consensus’-type of hegemony found in the US since 1980 – with its ever-increasing 
tolerance for inequality, which helped the set of distributive strategic choices found 
during this period, and their corresponding payoffs, become (as mentioned above) 
the most unlikely Nash equilibrium.  
FIGURE 23 
 
●  H S debt = Household sector debt; and H S net worth = Household sector net worth.  3-
year moving averages.  Source: US Census Bureau (2008), and US Federal Reserve (2009).   
 
During the 25-year period prior to 2007, while real household net worth increased 
(as a share of personal disposable income) from 450% to 615%, having peaked at 
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645% in 2006, household sector debt more than doubled as a share of disposable 
income (it jumped from 65% to 136%).  The US was not alone in this boom of 
household debt; in many other industrialised countries, especially in the UK and 
Iceland, households were also allowed, indeed encouraged, to accumulate an 
excessive amount of debt.  In the UK the latter reached roughly 1.7 times the level 
of household disposable income, and in Iceland more than 2 times.  In the process, 
households have accumulated an amount of financial risk that has proved to be at 
levels that are obviously not privately efficient, let alone socially efficient.  This 
excessive amount of risk has become evident in the alternate phase of the cycle, 
that of the ‘sudden stop’ to their access to additional financing. 
In all, the average household in the US is currently carrying US$122,000 in 
personal debts; to this one should add the above figure of US$547,000, which 
represents the average household share in overall government liabilities (from 
Treasury bonds to Medicare and military pensions).  The resulting two thirds of a 
million dollars defy belief. 
 
6.6   Capitalism can be reconstructed as a system with asymmetric 
‘compulsions’ – minimum for oligopolistic capital, maximum for workers 
and small and medium firms  
 
As discussed above (and in Foucault, 2004; and Khan, 2005), classical capitalism is 
characterised not just by the presence of market opportunities but by market 
‘compulsions’, which ensure that both capitalists (of all sizes) and workers (of all 
skills) continuously have to strive to improve their performance in order to remain in 
the market.  In no other economic system does continued existence depend on 
market competition, and therefore on the systematic improvement of labour 
productivity.  Only in capitalism are there continuous pressures from competitive 
struggles, which lead to the need constantly to improve the forces of production.  
Therefore, like in Alice in Wonderland, only in capitalism is it necessary to run just to 
stay in the same place.  However, what has emerged in practice from the neo-liberal 
experiment is a system in which some have been left with all the running, while 
others have preferred to catch a lift.  
The key issue here is not one of equity or fairness (though issues like these 
are important enough); it is (as the five previous rent-seeking economic ‘laws’ have 
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indicated) that those groups who have had the power to appropriate all the carrots 
have at the same time had the capacity to minimise the pressures they face for 
competitive struggles in the real economy (necessary for a historically-progressive 
capitalist system).  As the head of Chile’s largest holding company, and former 
President of the Confederation of Chilean Industry explains, “[t]his is a market 
economy in name only.  Competition has disappeared; mergers and acquisitions 
have led to a huge degree of oligopolistic concentration”.63  At the same time, large 
corporations have been able to increase ‘compulsions’ for other economic agents, 
such as ensuring that workers have to strive continuously in order to improve their 
performance just to survive in precarious labour markets, and small and medium-
sized firms have to strive continuously in order to improve their performance just to 
stay above water.  What oligopolistic capital has failed to understand is that in the 
long run capitalist development will necessarily take place on its own terms, 'warts 
and all'.  Not surprisingly, the neo-liberal capitalist system has not only lost a good 
deal of its capacities to develop the productive forces of society, but has also 
become even more crisis-ridden from within. 
 Perhaps the key lesson here is that no matter how ‘rational’ the neo-liberal 
discourse may have been initially in a Foucauldian sense, an institutional 
environment (neo-liberal or not) in which the economic élite faces so little challenge 
(either politically or ideologically) is bound to self-destruct.  In this, of course, most 
of the financial press has played a rôle especially due to the way in which they have 
interpreted economic news during the genesis and the outburst of the current crisis.  
First, in a long phase that could be called the ‘turning-a-blind-eye’ stage, good news 
was usually exaggerated and bad news ignored.  In the second, which could be 
called the ‘first omnipotent stage’, when eventually bad news could no longer be 
ignored and at least some had to be acknowledged, this was followed by an attitude 
of mostly ‘nothing really to worry about, everything is under control’.  In the final 
phase, which could be called the ‘second omnipotent stage’ (and only after a brief 
period of ‘shocked disbelief’), there was a turn towards an attitude best summarised 
by ‘I can take all this on my chin without having to have my economic ideology 
knocked down’…64   
                                   
63  http://www.atinachile.cl/node/4629. 
64  For a psychoanalytical understanding of this type of awareness / lack of awareness cycle, 
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How could anyone have believed that a debt-fuelled bubble of asset-price 
inflation was actually real wealth creation?  How could anyone have believed that top 
income earners could switch the process of accumulation towards the appropriation 
of an ever-increasing share of national income in a sustainable way?  How could 
anyone have believed that the top income earners and corporations could continue 
to part-pay/part-lend taxes and wages forever without creating unsustainable 
financial fragilities?  How could anyone have believed that the financial sector could 
keep making huge amounts of money forever by treating workers and governments 
as sitting ducks?  How could anyone have believed that a great deal of the financial 
press could keep putting such a positive spin in all this in a permanently credible 
way?  How could anyone have believed that the markets would not eventually call 
the neo-liberal bluff?  When this happened, as Krugman (2009B) remarks, “America 
[began to look] like the Bernie Madoff of economies: for many years it was held in 
respect, even awe, but it turns out to have been a fraud all along”. 
So, these six rent-seeking dynamics perfectly illustrate the ‘have your cake 
and eat it’ de facto nature of the neo-liberal paradigm, and its delusions that these 
rent-seeking dynamics were not only sustainable but even good for long-term 
growth.  They also demonstrate the ‘bad faith’ nature of its discourse – ‘bad faith’ in 
Sartre’s sense of mauvaise foi (i.e., of something aiming at deceiving oneself as 
much as at deceiving others). 
We are now clearly paying the price for allowing rent-seeking-style ‘sub-
prime’ capitalism to run wild, and for the delusional optimism of policymakers and 
regulators who believed that capitalism is at its most effective when they happily 
turn a blind eye to issues such as the risks associated with extreme income 
polarisation, multiple asset bubbles and credit booms.  ‘How can you be sure it is a 
bubble?’  ‘Do you know better than the market?’65   In fact, no policy-maker was 
willing to call the ‘irrational exuberance’ of asset prices a bubble since according to 
the efficient market hypothesis to call a bubble a bubble is a contradiction in terms.  
 
                                                                                                           
see Steiner (1993).  
65  According to the S&P/Case-Shiller national home-price index, between 1997 and 2006 
house prices in the US rose by 124%; in the same period prices in Great Britain went up by 





Following Foucault, as neo-liberalism is not really a set of economic policies (as in 
most ideologies, these are mostly contingent) but a new technology of power, the 
‘macroeconomics’ of the post-1980 era only make analytical sense when examined 
within the framework of the political settlement and distributional outcome in which 
it operates.  That is, when analysed from the perspective that what emerged de 
facto from the neo-liberal age was a new type of capitalism – one in which large 
segments of the capitalist élite wanted to have all the benefits that capitalism could 
possibly offer without having to worry about the usual inconveniences (such as 
competitive struggles) that normally come with these benefits.  And one that 
inflicted exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms.66  
To be precise, what neo-liberalism helped to unleashed was a type of 
capitalism characterised by an economic élite that thought that it could continue to 
‘split and project’ forever: keep the carrots, shift the sticks; get the upside, transfer 
the risks.  Paraphrasing Gore Vidal, this ‘split and project’ mechanism transformed 
this system into one characterised by ‘socialism for the rich and capitalism for the 
rest’.   
In fact, little seems to have changed since the onset of the 2007 crisis; while 
better than the plan of the former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson (which would 
have provided him with US$700 billion to spend at his sole discretion, without 
oversight or judicial review), the Geithner-Summers plan to deal with toxic assets 
has been labelled by Krugman as ‘lemon socialism’: “taxpayers bear the cost if 
things go wrong, but stockholders and executives get the benefits if things go right” 
(2009C).  At least for Scott Fitzgerald this would have come as no surprise – just 
further evidence that “the rich are just different from you and me”… 
It is not the first time in recent history that rentiers have tried to get rid of all 
fetters on their greed and transfer all associated risks; however, they have never 
succeeded on such a scale.  When eventually the market called their bluff, it became 
evident how short-sighted (and self-destructive) this strategy had been.  
                                   
66  My late friend and teacher Andrew Glyn argued that what came with globalisation was 
‘capitalism unleashed’ (Glyn, 2006); in fact, what was really unleashed was a very specific 
form of capitalism. 
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In other words, alongside some Schumpeterian innovators in the new 
information technologies, some venture capital involved in their operations, and the 
considerable investment in infrastructure for telecommunications that characterised 
the period of ‘installation’ of the current techno-economic paradigm (at least until 
the ‘dotcom’ bubble), what has also emerged since 1980 has been a new type of 
capitalism.  This has not only been extremely unequal and highly rent-based, but 
has been characterised by large segments of the capitalist élite attempting to create 
an economic, political and social environment in which they could not only resist 
change but also have their cake and eat it: call it ‘neo-liberal neo-Darwinism’.  That 
is, a deliberate attempt (especially from financial capital, and from the ‘mature’ and 
the most polluting industries of the previous techno-economic paradigm) to create 
the economic and political environment best suited to the survival of the un-fittest – 
i.e., un-fittest vis-à-vis what was required for a successful deployment in the real 
economy of a new ‘information-technology’ and ‘clean’ techno-economic paradigm.67 
What also emerged was a new neo-liberal ideology that (maybe not in theory 
but certainly in practice) provided the required legitimisation needed by financial 
groups and segments of productive capital both to block the necessary 
transformations, and to identify and exploit every imaginable new source of rent – 
so that productive investment and technological transformation could become an 
optional extra on top of assured rent-earnings opportunities.  It also provided the 
technologies of power with the required degree of sophistication for accomplishing 
the most remarkable ‘dispossession endeavour’ ever achieved within a democracy.  
                                   
67  Among the important components of that strategy were not just the abolition of most of 
the financial regulation erected during the ‘New Deal’ and the refusal of the Bush 
administration to join the ‘Kyoto agreement’, but also the lax implementation of the 
remaining environmental, competition and financial regulations.  In financial spheres, for 
example, the enforcement staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) actually 
shrunk 11 per cent in the two-year period prior to the onset of the sub-prime crisis, and the 
fines and other penalties it imposed dropped by more than half during the second term of the 
Bush administration.  It also allowed Bernard Madoff to keep operating even after having 
been alerted to his misdeeds by Harry Markopolos, an accountant and investment 
investigator who began pushing the SEC to investigate Madoff as early as 1999.  (For a 
detailed analysis of Markopolos's quest and the documents he submitted to the SEC to show 
that Madoff's record of consistent low-double-digit returns simply couldn't be legitimate, see 
the Wall Street Journal, December 18, 2008, especially the 19-page document Markopolos 
sent to regulators in 2005, ‘The World's Largest Hedge Fund Is a Fraud’, where he concludes 
that “I am pretty confident that BM [Bernard Madoff’s hedge fund] is a Ponzi Scheme.”  The 
WSJ article also explains how the SEC investigators had actually discovered by themselves as 
early as 2006 that Madoff had seriously misled the agency about how he managed customer 
money, yet the SEC decided not to take any action. 
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Maybe after the remarkable behaviour of ‘free’ agents in financial markets and in 
politics in the US during the recent past, mainstream economists and public choice 
theorists should perhaps take another look at their concept of the ‘rational agent’.  
Undoubtedly the most complex issue to understand is the rôle of democracy itself – 
especially the unmasking of the material basis for the ‘spontaneous consensus-type 
of hegemony’ that allowed all this. 
The neo-liberal discourse was also remarkably useful for providing the 
necessary façade of ‘modernity’ for this spontaneous consensus, which, as Adorno 
reminded us (see quote at the beginning of the paper), can be the most effective 
disguise; he also reminded us of its new ‘quality’: “[n]ewness only becomes mere 
evil in its totalitarian format, where all the tension between individual and society, 
that once gave rise to the category of the new, is dissipated” (1974, p. 185).  It can 
even be argued that (when it became unchallenged) post-industrial, ‘geriatric’ 
capitalism nearly brought to an end the specific culture in which it developed: the 
Enlightenment – and especially that crucial aspect that requires the submission of all 
authority to the scrutiny of critical reason. 
There are, of course, many lessons to be learned from the current financial 
crisis, such as those regarding the need for intelligent and imaginative financial 
regulation (both global and domestic) and effective capital controls in intrinsically 
unstable and fast-changing financial markets.68  As mentioned above, Keynes 
argued strongly for an international financial and payments system that would 
insulate nations at least partially from the economic maladies of other nations, and 
from the predatory nature of international finance.  This crisis also shows us the 
need for an economic environment that would favour ‘stickers’ rather than 
‘snatchers’ (in Hicks’ sense; see Penrose, 1995).  It has also expose the irrelevance 
of the ‘dismal science’ – at least in its ‘markets-always-know-best’ variety.  
However, the main lesson is that it exposed the high degree of toxicity of the 
(otherwise probably ‘rational’, in a Foucauldian sense) neo-liberal ideology when it 
became uncontested and put to the test by an intrinsically rent-seeking capitalist 
élite, and by an intrinsically compliant political class.  From this perspective, the 
                                   
68  One of these lessons, of course, is exactly the opposite of the rather popular view that 
there is not that much to be learnt from the current crisis as it is just one of those things that 
happens once-in-100-years…  
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roots of current financial crisis are not necessarily found in an ideology that is toxic 
per se.  Rather, these roots can be found mostly in a rent-seeking and politically 
unchallenged capitalist élite transforming neo-liberalism into a toxic ideology 
capable of generating a monsoon of toxic assets. 
Also, as mentioned above, it is clear by now that capitalism without the 
required level of ‘compulsions’ for oligopolistic capital, without a critical mass of 
opposition, and with such an amenable political class – and despite all the ever more 
dazzling financial pyrotechnics, and the ever more sophisticated breaking-down of 
value-chains in the global economy – is probably not that much more efficient than 
Communism without workers’ control over the bureaucracy.  I call this phenomenon 
“history’s impossibility theorem”: an economic system (neo-liberal or not) in which 
the élite faces little challenge either politically or ideologically not only becomes 
inefficient, but also prone to self-destruct.  Under those circumstances, it seems that 
the ‘death instinct’ inevitably takes over.  That is, what no longer seems historically 
feasible is for an economic and political élite to have its cake and eat it in a 
sustainable way.  It seems that the inevitable outcome of this is a predatory system, 
doomed to self-destruct.  What politically and economically looks ‘to good to be true’ 
is bound to be indeed too good to be true.  So, from a Hegelian perspective, it 
seems that neo-liberal manic reports of the death of history turned out to be rather 
premature.69  
It has become fashionable to blame mathematics for the poverty of 
mainstream economics, and for its complete failure to understand what was going 
on.  However, as an Oxford mathematician explains, the problem is not the use but 
the abuse of mathematics, particularly “[. . .] the corruption of quality and the 
abuse of uncertainty in mathematical models” (quoted in Davidson, 2009).70  In a 
way, mainstream economics of the last 30 years resembles those Hollywood films 
that are just special effects and little plot (consisting mostly of an unsophisticated 
ideological message) – with the special effects being provided by the ever more 
elegant algebra.  By now it is fairly clear that mainstream macro and financial 
economists not only helped cause the crisis and then failed to spot it, but also they 
                                   
69  Manias are found as much in ideologies as in asset prices…  See for example Glassman 
and Hassett’s Dow 36,000 (1999). 
70  For an analysis of mainstream economics’ ‘ontological fetishism’ with mathematics, see 
Palma (2008A). 
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now seem to have little idea of how to fix it and how to help prevent its repetition.  
However, most analysts still seem only to be surprised at the fact that practically 
nobody in the profession was able to predict the crisis – as if this were the only 
failure of mainstream economics that mattered.71   
Some have argued that this failure was due to the nature of academic 
economists’ financial incentives and the resulting conflicts of interest – something 
not dissimilar to what was happening on Wall Street.  For example, writing in the 
Financial Times, Devesh Kapur argues that: 
“Many academics, […] now have serious business interests and an array of 
financial ties to the very institutions that their studies address.  [..] But if 
financial incentives shape the behaviour of mere mortal human beings, might not 
they shape the behaviour of academics as well? […] There would be little chance 
of being invited to give a lucrative talk at Citicorp if one were in favour of 
sovereign debt forgiveness in the 1980s, against capital account liberalisation in 
the 1990s or against stock options in the 2000s.  […] Tenure was meant to 
ensure academic freedom, not protect academics from financial wheeler-
dealing.’72  
 
Although this is a very important point, I would argue that mainstream economics’ 
bad performance in predicting the future – and in understanding the present and the 
past – should be found mostly in its remarkable success in engineering an academic 
environment in which it got rid of all forms of critical thinking (see for example 
Pasinetti, 2008).  From a psychoanalytic point of view, this then became a vicious 
circle; the more it succeeded in purging all diversities of ideas, the poorer it became, 
and the more intolerant of dissent it had to be – in relation to knowledge there 
seems to be a strong direct relationship between the expectation to understand the 
                                   
71  Although for Friedman (1953) prediction was indeed the only thing that mattered; for him, 
if positive economics was to become a ‘hard’ science, prediction would have to be the only 
meaningful test for its ideas.  If that were the case, the current crisis has shown that his 
economics (and disciples) have failed rather badly…   
72  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6584fd56-6027- 11de-a09b-00144feabdc0.html.  From this 
perspective, Robert Schiller (one of the few economists that predicted the crisis) raised a few 
eyebrows with his new prescription for reducing future financial fragility: not fewer 
derivatives, but more of them.  In his opinion “[…] errors are inevitable and we shouldn't 
overreact to them. […] very few people are hedging their home-price risk.  [So] We are 
launching on the New York Stock Exchange some single-family home securities [securities 
tied to house prices, and] we hope [that they] will be available to a broad spectrum of 
investors.” (See http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Economist_Robert_Shiller_Prescribes_ 
More_Derivatives/1512509.html).  
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real world and the tolerance of dissent (see Britton, 2002; especially his 
understanding of fundamentalism).73 
Adam Smith (among others) warned us long ago that without true 
competition (on all fronts) there is no progress; and then Charles Darwin 
demonstrated that for the struggle for life to be properly successful what is required 
is not just competition but diversity in that competition. 
 Some look at this crisis as ‘opportunity’, especially those who look at it from 
the perspective of repeated long technological cycles.  They tell us that things are 
bound to change for the better since this crisis is also bound to help bring about the 
phase of ‘deployment’ of the current ‘IT’ techno-economic paradigm.  In the past, 
this phase has been characterised mostly by the reversal of the relationship between 
financial and productive capital, which allows the latter to take the lead and unleash 
all the potential of the new technological paradigm – including the considerable 
‘creative destruction’ forces of the ‘deployment’ phase.  Furthermore, in this reversal 
productive capital can benefit enormously from the ‘over-investment’ in new 
infrastructures (in this case in telecommunications) characteristic of the bubble 
during the ‘installation’ period (the ‘dotcom’ bubble).  In sum, financial crises of the 
current type have in the past helped the ‘deployment’ phase of previous techno-
economic paradigms which, in turn, have brought about ‘golden ages’ (see 
especially Pérez, 2002). 
However, I think that this time recovery from the crisis may prove to be more 
complex and problematic than (say) in the 1930s.  Basically, capitalism now faces a 
crisis ‘without an enemy’ – either from within (e.g. organised labour), or from the 
outside.  That is, it is unlikely that in the 1930s Roosevelt would have been able to 
carry out all the political and economic transformations that were necessary to 
overcome the crisis, and help ‘deploy’ the fourth techno-economic paradigm were it 
not for the combined threat of increased domestic instability and growing external 
challenges from the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.74  In other words, the 
                                   
73  According to Britton, in fundamentalism what is important is not what you read, it is how 
you read it; it is not what you think, it is how you think it; it is not what you believe, it is how 
you believe it.  
74  These transformations included tightening the regulation of financial capital – not just to 
control its excesses, but also to shift it towards financing productive investment (along the 
lines of Keynes quote above; see footnote 33); a rapid increase in the marginal rate of 
income taxation; and the beginning of the welfare state.  
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successful transformations of the 1930s had as much to do with the political 
imperative to come out of the recession in the face of internal and external 
challenges, as with the objective requirements of the ‘deployment’ period of the 
fourth techno-economic paradigm (e.g., mass production needing mass 
consumption fuelled by a fast-growing income of the bottom 90%).  The latter 
provided the logic; the former facilitated its implementation (and hugely reduced the 
political and economic transaction costs of this transition). 
The same goes for the remarkable common sense of the Bretton Woods 
accord and the rapid development of the welfare state in many industrialised 
countries after World War II.  Keynes’ task would certainly have been more difficult 
had the participants of that meeting at Bretton Woods not desperately wanted some 
sanity after the madness of the war; and it was difficult for Churchill and his 
Conservative Party to offer unemployment, poverty and destitution to returning 
soldiers by completely opposing the welfare reforms of the new post-war Labour 
administration.  
Furthermore, current problems are compounded by the fact that both 
financial and productive capital will probably emerge from the current crisis with an 
even higher degree of oligopolistic power.  So it is hard to imagine how it will be 
politically feasible for the state even to start doing the necessary ‘disciplining’ of the 
capitalist élite along the lines of increased ‘compulsions’ for big business (needed for 
a successful transformation of the process of accumulation from its current mostly 
rent-seeking nature to one based on increased productive capacities).  In fact, in 
Foucault’s terms, what is required even to start injecting some efficiency into the 
system is a shift from the current neo-liberal state of affairs – in which ‘the state is 
under the surveillance of the market’ – to a liberal-Keynesian one where ‘it is the 
market that is under the surveillance of the state’.  Unless the severity of the current 
financial crisis is such that it finally ends up making an effective transition possible, 
perhaps this crisis will be remembered not just for its unique difficulties but for the 
length of time that it took to come out of it.  
Those who, like Samuel Brittan, want to ‘save capitalism’ from a left-turn (as if 
capitalism were an endangered species), tell us that the ‘danger’ ahead is that: 
“The assumption that the pursuit of self-interest within the rules and 
conventions of society will also promote the public interest is not likely to 
survive – if only because the content of these rules is up for grabs.  But it is all 
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too likely to be succeeded by a mushy collectivist pseudo-altruism, in which 




There are two things these analysts do not seem to realise. One is that their project 
still needs to find a solution to a rather complex problem: how to construct a workable 
political and economic capitalist agenda when you are saddled with: 
i).- an intrinsically rentier capitalist élite that does not even seem to know what 
capitalism is all about; 
ii).- a remarkably short-sighted and greedy managerial set.  Remember that financial 
executives were not the only ones quite happy to bet their institutions on wishful-
thinking – i.e., not the only ones whose wishful-thinking became delusional.  Also, 
remember that hedge fund manager who complained that an annual bonus of over 
US$ 200 million was not enough?  Or the former AIG Chief Executive Officer who is 
currently accused of improperly taking US$4.3 billion in stock from his company’s 
pension fund (via a Bermuda-based holding company), because he was ‘angry’ at 
being ousted by the company amid investigations of accounting irregularities?;  
iii).- the most unimaginative and lacklustre political class for generations (Obama 
hopefully being the exception, although unfortunately not much hope for his economic 
team); and  
iv).-  an economics profession that keeps looking at ‘markets’ mostly like creationists 
look at evolution.  
The other thing they do not seem to realise is that the main cost of this crisis is 
not the many trillion dollars’ worth of asset deflation and output disruption (real as 
they are), let alone the ‘jealousy and envy’ that may flourish if there were a turn 
towards a ‘collectivist pseudo-altruism’ (fictional or valid as Brittan’s worries may be), 
but that this crisis leaves us wide open to the real possibility of a right-wing, 
xenophobic, fascist backlash. 
So far, the signs are not very promising.  The current economic crisis seems to 
be changing everything except the fundamental ways in which those in power and 
academia, and big market players think about economics and politics.  In fact, 
according to Roubini (2009), policy-makers still desperately hold on to the idea that 
what is going on now is just: 
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“[…] a crisis of confidence – an animal-spirit-driven, self-fulfilling recession – 
that has led to a collapse of liquidity (as counterparties don't trust one another), 
and of aggregate demand (as concerned households and firms cut consumption 
and investment in ways that can turn a regular business-cycle recession into a 
near-depression).”75  
 
Perhaps nothing is more revealing in this regard than the delusion that showering 
money with little or no conditionality into the financial system (mostly rewarding 
‘principals’ of financial institutions for their failure to oversee that their ‘agents’ run 
financial institutions in the shareholders’ long-term interests) means that ‘we are all 
Keynesians again’.  For example, in October 2008 (in one of the most blatant cases of 
‘crony-capitalism’ ever), the British Chancellor paid £20 billion for 60% of the shares 
of the Royal Bank of Scotland despite the fact that the stock market valuation of 
those shares at the time was less than half that amount – so, paraphrasing Joan 
Robinson, “we are all ‘Bastard Keynesians’ again”…76  And there is little evidence so 
far from financial markets of the much promised ‘invigorating reappraisal of 
priorities’…  In fact, the prevailing idea among the chattering classes remains that the 
current financial crisis does not represent the failure of both a whole model of banking 
and finance (in which an overgrown financial sector did an untold amount of harm), 
and of a whole model of policy-making (in which the fundamental rôle of the state 
ended up being one of a facilitator of the rent-seeking practices of big business).  
Indeed, by mid-2009 Morgan Stanley is already packaging downgraded collateralized 
debt obligations together into new securities, and these are getting investment grade 
ratings from Moody's and Standard & Poor's.  Some are even AAA rated…  And 
Goldman Sachs, despite being “[…] the richest welfare recipient you're likely to meet 
outside of the defense sector […] has set aside an $11.4 billion bonus pool. That 
averages out to $400,000 per employee, which is about what Wall Street firms were 
paying before the credit bubble collapsed in 2007”.77  
                                   
75  See also Krugman (2009A).  
76  Furthermore, as the net worth of that bank at the time was in all likelihood negligible, it is 
questionable whether he should have even paid the market value of those shares, as all that 
the stock market was probably doing in pricing those shares at a positive value was pricing 
the likely amount of the impending government subsidy (a bit of simultaneous causation 
here).  It is unusual to see more alcohol being prescribe as a cure for a hangover…  
77  http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/19/banks-bailout-recession-recovery-opinions-
columnists-wall-street_print.html.  Among many other subsidies, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation is currently guaranteeing US$28 billion of Goldman’s debt.  
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In this respect, it is rather depressing to see how the current Geithner-
Summers plan for rescuing the US financial system, and the Brown-Darling one for 
the British system, have as their underlying vision that the post-crisis financial system 
will be more or less the same as it was before the 2007-crisis, although somewhat 
tamed by prudent market-friendly regulations – and anyone who disagrees, of course, 
is just politically naïve.  And (as supposedly the current crisis is just one of illiquidity 
and lack of confidence) it is also depressing to see how their plan for getting from A to 
B consists just of easy money, the assurance that the financial system’s liabilities are 
now backed by an (implicit and explicit) government guarantees, and a massive fiscal 
stimulus – so far, in the US alone these are worth US$12 trillion in terms of liquidity 
support and public guarantees, insurances and recapitalisations – just the rescue of 
AIG has cost taxpayers US$173 billion (and counting).78  And, according to Neil 
Barofsky, the special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program set up 
by the Treasury Department (in testimony to a House committee), “[t]he total 
potential federal government support could reach up to $23.7 trillion”.79  So finance 
ministers and central bankers are prepared to become lenders of first and only resort, 
spenders of first and only resort, and insurers of first and last resort – but not 
financial architects of any resort at all.80  
Martin Wolf has argued in his column in the Financial Times that ‘another 
ideological god has failed’.81  Yes, no doubt, but the idolatry seems to go on and on… 
For example, as late as June 2009, in a Congressional testimony Mary Schapiro, the 
chair of the SEC, still insisted that “[d]erivatives allow parties to hedge and manage 
risk, which itself can promote capital formation.”  And (as mentioned above) for the 
British Chancellor the current system of ‘light- and limited-touch’ financial regulation, 
                                   
78  As Krugman reminds us, in terms of government guarantees, “[…] the last time there was 
a comparable expansion of the financial safety net, the creation of federal deposit insurance 
in the 1930s, it was accompanied by much tighter regulation, to ensure that banks didn’t 
abuse their privileges. This time, new regulations are still in the drawing-board stage – and 
the finance lobby is already fighting against even the most basic protections for consumers” 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/opinion/17krugman.html?_r=1).  
79  See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/business/economy/21bailout.html.  
80  Part of the reason for this is the above-mentioned ‘once-in-a-100-year-event’ type of 
thinking.  As Joseph Mason explains, “[t]hat absolves banks and regulators from 
responsibility for reforming in a meaningful fashion financial regulation.”  (http://www. 
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=aBarTDxTnxQQ#) 
81  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c6c5bd36-0c0c-11de-b87d-0000779fd2ac.html.  
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with its emphasis on self-regulation and market discipline, should not be changed, as 
it is not really to be blamed for the financial crisis.  With all we know by now, how can 
anyone still make either claim with a straight face?82  
One should never forget Gramsci’s proposition that more often than not battles 
are won or lost on the terrain of ideology.  Paraphrasing Buiter (2009B), it may never 
have been so necessary to have policy-makers ‘whose cognitive abilities have not 
been warped by a modern Anglo-American Ph.D. education’. 
Finally, from the point of view of the rôle of ‘compulsions’ in capitalism, it 
seems that most politicians (including the ‘new’ left), policy-makers and academics 
(including most economists) do not seem to understand that the key issue at stake in 
all this is that there are two opposite visions of how to try to make capitalism work 
more effectively (only some policy-makers in Asia seem to realise this).  From a 
Marxian, Keynesian and Foucauldian points of view (as I would argue that from a 
Foucauldian perspective the interrelation of progress, discipline, freedom and 
compulsion will also support such a view), what is necessary is to keep capitalists on 
their toes; from a neo-liberal one it is to keep them sweet – and, as if more evidence 
was necessary, with the current global financial crisis we now know for sure what 










                                   
82  In other words, don’t let minor inconveniences, such as the real world, get in the way of 
your ideology.  (This reminds us of what Einstein once said: “Two things are infinite: the 
universe and human stupidity; and I'm not sure about the universe”.)  See http://www. 
nytimes.com/2009/06/26/business/26norris.html?hp, and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
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